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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS ON OPTIMAL MIX OF TAXES, SPATIALITY AND PERSISTENCE
UNDER TAX EVASION
BY
MOHAMMAD YUNUS
Committee Chair: Dr. James R. Alm
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation analyzes the optimal mix of direct and indirect taxes in an
economy with multiple tax collecting authorities when both the taxes are subject to
evasion and to what extent the tax compliance behavior of individuals in the United
States are persistent and spatially dependent.
Essay I derives and provides an intuitive interpretation of: (i) impact of the
changes in the government instruments on tax evasion by firms, the expected prices they
charge, and the expected tax rates they face; (ii) a generalized version of Ramsey rule for
optimal commodity taxation which accounts for income tax evasion from either or both
the tax authorities; (iii) generalized formulae for the optimal income tax rate for each of
the tax authorities; and (iv) the tradeoff between optimal tax rates and audit probabilities
for each of the tax authorities. It also re-examines controversies surrounding the uniform
income taxes and the differentiated commodity taxes, and investigates how income tax
evasion affects the progressivity of the income tax rates. It concludes that whether or not

xi

tax evasion calls for reductions in the optimal income tax rates hinges on how tax evasion
and the associated concealment costs vary across individual taxpayers.
Essay II introduces the twin issues of spatiality and persistence in the individual
income tax evasion. While the issue of persistence arises through accumulated learning
over time, spatiality arises for several reasons. Some these include the exchange of
information between taxpayers; the social norm of tax compliance: an individual would
comply if everybody in the society complies and vice versa; individuals faced with
dynamic stochastic decision problems that pose immense computational challenges may
simply look to others to infer satisfactory policies and interpersonal dependence works
through learning by imitating rather than learning by doing. State-level annual per return
evasion of individual income tax and related data were used to examine the above
hypotheses and found supports for both of them in the individual income tax evasion in
the United States.

xii

ESSAY I: TAX EVASION AND OPTIMAL MIX OF TAXES

INTRODUCTION
Depending on the feasibility of choices, policymakers in both developed and
developing economies face the challenging task of striking a delicate balance between the
direct and indirect taxes in the face of differential tax compliance. Insofar as taxes cannot
be collected without costs, different proposals for tax instruments and tax structures
should be judged on the basis of their administrative advantages, differential compliance,
equity, efficiency, adequacy, and induced concealment costs. The World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund usually prescribe that developing countries rely more on
indirect taxation in some form of uniform commodity taxes, especially the value added
taxes because indirect taxes are more difficult to evade. The justification for this
prescription is that poorly developed institutional structures of the tax collecting agencies
in these countries are not conducive to collecting direct taxes in the face of ubiquitous
nature of tax noncompliance and venal tax officials. The critics of this prescription
usually point at the regressive nature of indirect taxation and question the presumption
that evasion of commodity taxes is innocuous.
The optimal taxation theory offers hardly any guidance to resolve this debate, for
this literature is primarily concerned with characterizing the tax structure that minimizes
inefficiencies when the tax base is observable at no costs while giving due cognizance to
equity concerns. Feasibility constraints in tax collection had remained outside the usual
purview of optimal taxation literature until tax evasion literature made inroads into public
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finance. How do differences in evasion characteristics of taxes affect the choice and
design of optimal tax systems? Why do the direct and the indirect taxes coexist even in
presence of tax evasion in most countries? If both the direct and the indirect taxes are to
be collected, how should one strike a balance in designing an optimal mix? The existing
literature does not provide much substantive ground to resolve these issues.
This essay is an exploration of the role of tax evasion in the design of tax systems.
Our particular interest lies in how tax evasion affects the optimal mix of direct and
indirect taxes in the presence of multiple tax collecting authorities. It attempts to build on
Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994). These authors provide a justification for an
optimal tax solution in a model with linear commodity taxes and non-linear income taxes
when only the latter can be evaded at private costs. Despite offering an important insight
into how evasion of both direct and indirect taxes affects the optimal tax structures, their
work fails to account for some realistic features of actual tax systems. For instance,
evaders in their model are never caught in their cheating. Thus, these are models of tax
avoidance with differential compliance costs, and therefore lack a crucial feature of tax
evasion—the uncertainty it introduces into the agents’ decision making due to the
presence of random audits. This is of critical relevance scores of studies have shown that
uncertainty brings significant changes to the fundamental rules suggested by certainty
models of optimal taxation. Further, it is also unrealistic to assume that commodity taxes
are not subject to evasion.
We consider a model with linear income and commodity taxes both of which can
be evaded at private costs in a world with two tax collecting authorities. One may think
of the two tax authorities as the federal and state revenue authorities as in the U.S. or tax
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authorities at the national and local government levels in other countries. In practice,
there may be more than two levels of tax authorities in some countries such as in the U.S.
Thus, the assumption of two tax authorities would serve as a prototype of the real world
complexities, especially for the large western capitalist economies. This is equally true
for many developing economies with large territorial boundaries. The sheer size of these
economies makes it hard for the tax administration to control everything from the center.
Besides, with federal constitutional system allows the local governments in many of the
developing countries to impose and collect taxes in their own jurisdictions apart from the
taxes imposed by the federal government.
While firms pay commodity taxes to a single tax authority, income earners have
to pay taxes to two different tax authorities. Our analysis shows how the standard results
in the optimal taxation literature are affected by evasion of direct and/or indirect taxes by
individuals and firms while accounting for the uncertainty arising from tax audits by at
least one of the tax authorities and the costs associated to the concealment of true tax
liability. By including the audit probabilities on both income and commodities in the set
of feasible instruments, our model is one of optimal taxation and optimal enforcement of
the tax laws. From this perspective, our model is closer to Slemrod (1994). With
countries gradually heading towards uniform tax rates, the model provides a justification
for the relevance of the analysis and a logically consistent framework to study important
policy questions related to the optimal mix of taxes, the design of optimal tax structures,
and the optimal enforcement of the tax base.
The optimal tax system in our model involves a mix of linear income taxes and
differentiated commodity taxes. We derive and provide an intuitive interpretation of: (i)
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the impact of the changes in the government instruments on tax evasion by firms, the
expected prices they charge, and the expected tax rates they face; (ii) a generalized
version of Ramsey rule for optimal commodity taxation which accounts for income tax
evasion from either or both the tax authorities; (iii) generalized formulae for the optimal
income tax rates for each of the tax authorities; and (iv) the tradeoff between optimal tax
rates and audit probabilities for each of the tax authorities. We also re-examine
controversies surrounding the uniform income taxes and the differentiated commodity
taxes, and how income tax evasion affect the progressivity of the income tax rates. We
conclude that whether or not tax evasion calls for reductions in the optimal income tax
rates (and thus lower progressivity) hinges on how tax evasion and the associated
concealment costs vary across individual taxpayers.
Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on the optimal taxation and tax
evasion. Section 3 develops a model and discusses the behaviors of firms and individuals
together with some key comparative static results. Sections 4 and 5 restate the optimal tax
problem, and derive and discuss the expressions that characterize the optimal commodity
tax structure and the optimal income tax rates for the two tax authorities, compare them
with their well-known analogues in standard optimal tax models, and discuss conditions
under which the two coincide while highlighting the new features of our model. Section 6
investigates the issue of the progressivity of the optimal income tax rates. Section 7
characterizes the tradeoff between optimal commodity tax rates and audit probabilities
and the optimal enforcement of income taxes. Finally, Section 8 concludes with a
summary of results and the avenue of future research.

5
A BRIEF REVIEW OF TAX EVASION AND OPTIMAL TAXATION
The essay touches two strings of issues in public finance—optimal taxation and
tax evasion. The optimal tax literature has been primarily concerned with characterizing
the tax structure that minimizes the distortions that second best taxation entails to
individual choices of work and consumption while achieving certain equity goals.
Personal commodity consumption is not observable (or very costly to observe) in
Ramsey’s (1927) optimal linear commodity tax problem. The tax authority observes
aggregate demand or output of each commodity, and uses this observation as a screening
device based on a priori information about the differences in consumption patterns
between individuals with different ability. On efficiency grounds, the Ramsey rule
suggests higher tax rates on commodities with lower elasticity of demand. But it does not
specify the conditions that make uniform commodity tax rate optimal. In the optimal
income taxation models following Mirrlees (1971), the tax authority observes income of
the individuals but cannot observe their ability and/or labor supply independently. Taxes
are then levied on income that is taken as a proxy for an individual’s productivity. A
fundamental normative question of tax policy is then determining the optimal degree of
income tax progressivity.
Following Ramsey (1927) and Mirrlees (1971), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
show that tax structure does not involve a mix of taxes when preferences between
consumption and leisure is weakly separable; a general income tax suffices to achieve the
revenue and redistributive goals. When the only set of instruments available to the
government are a linear income tax and linear commodity taxes, Deaton (1979, 1981)
shows that uniform commodity taxation is optimal if preferences are separable between

6
goods and leisure and the Engel curves are linear. The linear income tax suffices, as
commodity taxes do not serve any additional redistributive goal. Auerbach (1985), Stern
(1987), and Stiglitz (1988) provide thorough surveys on the optimal taxation literature.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) give a comprehensive treatment of the subject.
The basic tenet of tax evasion models is that neither individual income nor
consumption (nor sales of firms) are observable to tax authorities without costs. Tax
assessments are largely based on taxpayers’ reports. Occasionally tax authorities conduct
audits on taxpayers to determine their true tax liability. Since the availability of audits
expands the tax authorities’ set of instruments, it brings forth new tradeoffs in the design
of optimal tax policy. Further, the efficiency costs of the tax system are no longer limited
to the usual distortions of individual labor supply and consumption choices. The costs of
administering and enforcing the tax system and the compliance costs of taxpayers impose
an additional deadweight loss to the society. These include audit costs, filing costs along
with the costs incurred by taxpayers to conceal their true tax liability. As a result, tax
authorities’ policies are no longer preoccupied with choosing the optimal tax base and
structure of taxation as the same revenue objective can now be achieved through a
combination of several policy instruments.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Kolm (1973), and Srinivasan (1973) are the
seminal papers that first studied the tax evasion problem. These authors treat tax evasion
as a problem of individual choice under uncertainty to which standard portfolio allocation
theory could be applied. Sandmo (1981) and Kaplow (1990) were the first to look into the
problem of optimal income and commodity taxation respectively. They derive modified
rules for optimal income and commodity tax rates that account for tax evasion and
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characterize the factors that determine the choice between higher taxation and tighter
enforcement of tax laws. Cremer and Gahvari (1993) introduce tax evasion into the
Ramsey commodity taxation problem and derive a modified version of Ramsey rule for
optimal commodity taxes, characterize the tradeoff between optimal tax rates and audit
probabilities and discuss how tax evasion and its concealment affect some standard
results such as the optimality of uniform commodity taxes. With the exception of Sandmo
(1981), the above works focus on a representative consumer economy and hence do not
examine fully the issue of tax progressivity. Slemrod (1994) studies the impact of tax
avoidance on optimal income tax progressivity in a linear income tax model with a costly
tax enforcement mechanism, and concludes that increased tax enforcement is an
alternative to higher tax rate for ensuring income tax progressivity. Cremer and Gahvari
(1994) also focus on evasion in the linear tax problem but study the role of the income
concealment technology, particularly how the possibility to influence the probability of
being caught evading and the costs of concealment affect the progressivity of optimal
linear income tax. Cremer and Gahvari (1996) study the effect of evasion and
concealment costs in the optimum general income tax framework. Cowell (1990),
Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998), Alm (1999), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) are
classic surveys on tax evasion literature.
The above results on optimal taxation and tax evasion do not provide any
satisfactory ground to justify the common coexistence of direct and indirect taxation.
Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994) are the first to use differences in tax evasion as
a rationale for justifying a mix of direct and indirect taxes as optimal. They consider the
choice between a general income tax and linear commodity tax in a two-class economy
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where taxes have different evasion characteristics, including concealment costs and show
that, in general, the optimal tax solution involves a mix of taxes—a result in sharp
contrast to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). Under the premise that indirect taxes are harder
to evade, their model allows for evasion of only the direct taxes.
Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994) lack an enforcement mechanism to
audit income reports—a crucial issue that comes with tax evasion as it introduces
uncertainty into the agents’ decision making. This is of critical relevance since works by
Weiss (1976), Eaton and Rosen (1980a, 1980b), Varian (1980), Stiglitz (1982), Hamilton
(1987), and Cremer and Gahvari (1995) show that optimal taxation rules are substantially
modified in the presence of uncertainty. Moreover, enforcement parameters in these
studies are excluded from the set of feasible tax revenue instruments of the tax
authorities. But Slemrod (1994) stresses that optimal tax problem should consider both
the choice of tax rules and their enforcements.
Our model combines two linear income taxes and a linear commodity tax subject
to evasion at private costs. We extend Cremer and Gahvari’s (1993) commodity tax
evasion problem to an economy with risk averse firms and juxtapose two linear income
taxes for two different tax authorities that are also subject to evasion. In contrast to
Cremer and Gahvari (1994), we relax the assumption of quasi-linear preferences in
analyzing the income taxes, and show that this is crucial to determining the extent to
which tax evasion affects optimal tax rules. By expanding the set of feasible instruments
to include audit probabilities, we investigate the tradeoffs that arise between tax rates and
audit probabilities as an alternative means to raise tax revenues. Since the difficulties in
observing personal consumption patterns and higher costs of administering and enforcing
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a system of multiple taxes dictate a heavy reliance on a few tax rates, our model bears
relevance to most real world tax systems.

A MODEL OF TAX EVASION AND MIX OF TAXES
Consider a competitive economy with n industries each with “many” identical
firms producing a homogenous commodity. Individuals have identical preferences over
the set of n commodities and leisure but differ in their abilities. There are two tax
authorities—A and B; tax authority A collects a fixed amount of revenue by imposing
taxes on wage income while B collects revenue by imposing taxes on both wage income
and commodity sales.
Like other tax evasion models none of the tax authorities observe true incomes of
individuals or sales of firms (by tax authority B). Therefore, tax assessments are based on
individuals’ income and firms’ sales reports. Tax authorities carry out costless cursory
examinations that reveal tax-dodgers unless the latter spend resources to conceal incomes
and output. Tax authorities also carry random independent audits of taxpayers that reveal
true incomes and sales proceeds.
Tax authority B collects a fixed amount of revenue MB by choosing the n×1
vector of commodity tax rates t , with ti ∈ [0, 1] and industry specific audit probabilities,

σ , with σ i ∈ (0, 1) , the parameters of linear income tax function tB, the lump sum grant
αB and the probability of randomly audited incomes σB. Similarly, tax authority A
collects a fixed amount of revenue MA by choosing the parameters of linear income tax
function tA, the lump sum grant αA and the probability of randomly audited incomes σA.
Finally, there is a ‘super government’ that maximizes a strictly concave Bergson-
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Samuelson social welfare function that represents the social preferences for redistribution
subject to the revenue constraints of the two tax authorities.
Firm’s Sales Report
Firms in our model are characterized by constant returns to scale technology. The
marginal cost of production, ci, in industry i is constant for all firms, but it differs across
industries. Industry i sells its output, Xi, in a competitive market at price pi and is subject
to a commodity tax rate t i . Tax authority B assesses the due taxes of a typical firm in the
industry based on its reported sales. A firm can evade taxes by reporting only a fraction
0 ≤ δ i ≤ 1 of its sales. The tax authority B carries out a cursory scrutiny of the firm’s

report that reveals true sales proceeds unless the latter spends resources to conceal its
unreported sales. Each firm incurs a cost of concealment Gi (1 − δ i ) per unit of output zi.
These costs are proportional to unreported output. Let us assume that Gi (1 − δ i ) is strictly
convex with Gi' (0) → 0 and Gi' (1) → ∞ . Define g i (1 − δ i ) = (1 − δ i )Gi (1 − δ i ) . This implies
that g i' (0 ) → 0 and g i' (1) → ∞ .
Firms in each industry face a probability, σ i , of audit that is independent of their
sales reports. When caught cheating, firms have to pay the true taxes due plus a penalty
(θ -1) proportional to the amount of taxes evaded. The penalty rate is assumed to be
exogenous and equal in all industries. Firms take prices and enforcement parameters set
by the tax authority B as given, and maximize expected profits by choosing output and
the proportion of sales reported for tax assessments. Thus, firm i’s sales report is
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ΓNCi = pi − g i − δ i ti if it is not caught cheating and ΓC i = pi − g i − ti − (θ − 1)(1 − δ i )ti if it is

caught cheating.
We will derive the expected profit assuming that firms are risk-averse.1 The
competitive assumption together with the constant marginal costs and proportional
concealment costs imply that output will be determined endogenously in the case of riskaverse firms. This assumption is at variance with Cremer and Gahvari (1993) who adopt
separability due to assumption of risk neutrality. This separability no longer exists when
firms are risk-averse as is typically the case for small-scale owner-managed businesses.
Under these circumstances, the problem faced by firms in this economy can be analyzed
by focusing on a representative firm. Hence, firm i in one of the industries solves:

max E (π i ) = (1 − σ i )π i [( pi − g i − δ i ti )zi ] + σ iπ i [{pi − g i − ti − (θ − 1)(1 − δ i )ti }zi ] − ci zi (3.1)
δi

The assumptions of risk aversion of firms and the convexity of the concealment
technology imply that the above expected profits function is strictly concave. Thus, the
first and the second order conditions for this problem are:

(1 − σ i )π i' (ΓNCi )(g i' − ti )zi + σ iπ i' (ΓCi )(g i' + ti (θ − 1))zi = 0
(1 − σ i )⎡⎢π i'' (ΓNCi )(g i' − ti )
⎣

1

2 2
zi

(

)

( )(

(3.2)

)

2
⎤
⎡
⎤
− π i' ΓNCi g i'' z i ⎥ + σ i ⎢π i" ΓCi g i' + ti (θ − 1) z i2 − π i' (ΓC i )g i'' z i ⎥ < 0 (3.3)
⎦
⎣
⎦

It is a polemic issue if firms are risk-averse or risk neutral. To us risk aversion is a tenable assumption for
the small-scale firms while risk neutrality assumption is necessary for firms with corporate environment.
Although large firms with corporate culture individually pays more tax revenue to tax authority, tax
payments of the small firms as a group far exceed their counterpart of the large firms. Thus modeling firms
as risk averse comes closer to reality. Further, the relevant propositions, theorems etc. for risk neutral firms
are special case of the risk neutral firms.
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The first order condition can be rewritten as:

g i′ (1 − δ i ) =

[

( ) ]
(ΓNC )+ σ iπ i' (ΓC )

ti (1 − σ i )π i' (ΓNC i ) − σ iπ i' ΓCi (θ − 1)

(

)

1 − σ i π i'

i

(3.2′)

i

Since by assumption g i′ (1 − δ i ) > 0 , a necessary condition for δ i > 0 is that returns to
evasion be positive or equivalently (1 − σ i )π i' (ΓNC i ) > σ iπ i' (ΓC i )(θ − 1) . Since we are
interested in interior solution, we assume that this condition is satisfied. Note that the
equivalent condition derived by Cremer and Gahvari (1993) is a special case of (3. 2′)
under assumption of risk neutrality of firms.
Let us define

tie = ti {δ i + (1 − δ i )σ iθ }

(3.4)

to be the expected tax rate on the i-th commodity. Given a large number of firms the
pricing condition in industry i then becomes:

pi = ci + g i (1 − δ i ) + t ie

(3.5)

where g i (1 − δ i ) and tie are evaluated at δ i* that solves (3.2). Proposition 1 addresses how
the equilibrium is affected if one of the tax rates or the audit probabilities changes:
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Proposition 1: The effect of a change in the statutory tax rate would have an ambiguous
impact on the sales reports and the effective tax rate but would have a positive effect on
the prices charged by firms. The effect of a change in the probability of industry-specific
audit would be positive on the sales reports, the effective tax rate, and the prices charged
by firms.

[

(

] [

)

(

)

]

∂δ i (1 − σ i ) π i'' (ΓNC ) g i' − t i δ i z i + π i' z i + σ i π i'' (ΓC ) g i' + t i (θ − 1) (1 + (θ − 1)(1 − δ i ))z i − π i' (θ − 1)z i >
=
0 (3.6)
∂t i
<
D

∂tie
∂δ
>
= δ i + (1 − δ i )σ iθ + ti i (1 − σ iθ ) 0
∂ti
∂ti
<

(3.7)

∂pi
∂δ
>
= − g i' i + (1 − δ i )σ iθ 0
∂ti
∂ti
<

(3.8)

(

)(

)

( )(

)

'
'
'
'
∂δ i (1 − σ i )π i ΓNCi g i − ti − σ iπ i ΓCi g i + ti (θ − 1)
=
>0
∂σ i
D

(3.9)

⎡
⎤
∂tie
∂δ
= ti ⎢(1 − δ i )θ + i (1 − σ iθ )⎥ > 0
∂σ i
∂σ i
⎣
⎦

(3.10)

∂pi
= (1 − δ i )σ i tiθ > 0
∂σ i

(3.11)

where D is negative as defined in (3.3).
Proof: Differentiate (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5) with respect to the instruments at the disposal of
the tax authority B.
It is not surprising that most of the results of Cremer and Gahvari (1993) can be
derived from the above conditions when risk neutrality of firm is invoked. Condition
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(3.6) implies that an increase in the statutory commodity tax rate would induce an
increase or decrease in tax evasion depending upon the degree of absolute risk aversion.
This result is at variance with Cremer and Gahvari (1993) who report a positive
relationship between statutory tax rate and evasion in the case of risk-neutral firms.
When firms are risk-averse their proposition no longer holds since both the income and
substitution effects are now at work. However, condition (3.7) shows that the impact of a
change in the statutory tax rate transcends from the evasion decision to the effective tax
rate and hence the effect is ambiguous. Since we assume constant cost industry,
conditions (3.8) and (3.11) are not unexpected. Anything that increases the cost per unit
would also increase price proportionately.
Condition (3.9) implies that a higher industry-specific audit probability would
lead to higher tax compliance. This implies that higher audit probability would increase
industry-specific effective tax rate. These results are expected since higher audit rate
would have a salutary effect in protecting both the tax base and the statutory tax rate.
These results simply reflect the natural responses of a risk-averse firm to policies that
affect the expected return to tax evasion.

Lemma 1: Changes in tk and σk do not affect the values of pi and δi.

∂δ i
∂δ i
∂p
∂pi
=
= i =
=0
∂t k ∂σ k ∂tk ∂σ k

∀i ≠ k

(3.12)

Proof: It follows from industry-specific tax rate and audit probability assumptions.
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Individual’s Problem
Consider a continuum of individuals with different abilities distributed according
to a continuous distribution function F(w) with support on [wl, wh] – a closed interval on
R+. Each individual is endowed with 1 unit of time to allocate between leisure and
labor l . The value of w gives the relative efficiency of labor supplied per unit of time.
Given the assumption of linearly homogeneous technology, this represents the marginal
productivity of labor for a worker of ability w. The total productivity of a worker will
then be equal to her wage income y ≡ w l . Let X n ⊂ ℜ n+ be the commodity space and x
≡ {xi }i =1 be a vector of commodities. Individuals have identical preferences over Xn and
i =n

leisure 1- l represented by a well-behaved utility function U(x, 1- l ).
Individuals face linear income tax systems from tax authorities A and B with
constant marginal tax rates tA and tB and receive uniform lump sum transfers αA and αB
respectively from them as guaranteed income. They evade taxes by reporting proportions
δA and δB of their pre-tax wage income y. Tax authorities assess due taxes based on
reported incomes while carrying out cursory examinations that reveal cheating unless the
taxpayer spends resources to conceal true income. Concealment costs per $1 are given
by K i (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) . These costs are assumed to be proportional to undeclared
income and 0 ≤ δ A ≤ 1 also 0 ≤ δ B ≤ 1 . Let us assume that K(.) is strictly a quasi-convex
function with K i (0) = K i' (0 ) → 0 and K i′(1) → ∞ . Let us also assume as a simple case that
ki (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) = (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B )K i (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) . Then the above
restrictions on K i (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) imply that k i (0) = k i' (0 ) → 0 and ki′(1) → ∞ .
Individuals face random audits with probabilities σA and σB from tax authorities A and B,
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which are independent of the declared incomes to the tax authorities. Audit by a tax
authority would reveal the true income to that tax authority only. Once evasion is
established, individuals have to pay exogenous fines (θA – 1) and (θB – 1) proportional to
evaded taxes in addition to their true tax liabilities following the amendments Yitzhaki
(1974) made to the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model.
An individual might find herself in four different possible states depending on
whether she is audited by tax authority A or B, or by both, or not audited at all. Assume
that she makes her labor supply and income report decisions at the beginning of the
reference period, prior to knowledge of audit lotteries. These decisions determine her
wage income net of concealment costs. Depending on the outcome of the audit lotteries
her post-tax wage rate in four possible contingencies becomes:

w1 = w{1 − t A − t B − k (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B B ) − (θ A − 1)(1 − δ A )t A − (θ B − 1)(1 − δ B )t B } ⎫
⎪
w 2 = w{1 − t A − δ B t B − k (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) − (θ A − 1)(1 − δ A )t A }
⎪
⎬
w3 = w{1 − δ At A − t B − k (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) − (θ B − 1)(1 − δ B )t B }
⎪
⎪
w 4 = w{1 − δ At A − δ B t B − k (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B )}
⎭

(3.12)

with the associated probabilities of occurrence as:

S1 = σ Aσ B

⎫
⎪
S 2 = σ A (1 − σ B )
⎪
⎬
S3 = σ B (1 − σ A )
⎪
S 4 = (1 − σ A )(1 − σ B )⎪⎭

(3.13)
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4

Hence, the expected net return to her labor supply becomes ∑ S j w j . At the end of the
j =1

period, her post-audit tax treatment determines her after-tax income yj ≡ w j l available to
allocate over consumption of the n commodities in the state. No savings are allowed.
Hence, she has to devise a contingent consumption plan that meets the virtual budget
constraint in all four states. Let p = (p1, p2, …, pn) be the vector of consumer prices. The
virtual budget constraint for the individual can then be written as:

y j = w j l + α = p x j ; j = 1, 2,…, 4 and α ≡ αA + αB

(3.14)

Assume that the individual maximizes the expected utility. That means she takes the
vector of prices p, the income tax parameters (tA, tB, αA, and αB), and chooses the state
contingent vector of commodities xj, labor supply l and the proportions of income to
report (δA and δB) to solve:

4

Max Ψ = ∑ S jU j (x j ,1 − l )

s.t.

(3.14)

(3.15)

j =1

where Ψ is assumed to be a twice continuously differentiable and well-behaved function.
She simultaneously chooses her labor supply, and allocates the resulting pre-tax labor
income to a lottery with sure return (true tax liability report) and a random return (income
concealed from either tax authority or both) at a cost that is increasing and proportional to
the share of the risky asset on her portfolio. She buys off the opportunity to affect her
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effective income tax rates through her choice of the proportions of income reported. As a
result, both the ex-ante and ex-post effective marginal tax rates to tax authorities A and B
are no longer constant across individuals. Since uncertainty is not resolved until the end
of the period, when the individual learns whether she is audited or not by the tax
authorities A or B, her choice of consumption bundle becomes state contingent. Of
course, when choosing δA δB and l , the individual has to take into account her optimal
choice of xj. The Lagrangian and the associated first order conditions for this problem are
given in Appendix A.
The first order conditions for xj and δm (m = A, B) can be used to derive necessary
conditions for interior solutions for δm. Rewriting (A.7) and (A.8) in Appendix A gives:

k ′A (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) =

t A [(λ3 + λ4 ) − (θ A − 1)(λ1 + λ2 )]
4

∑λ j

(3.16)

j =1

k B′ (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) =

t B [(λ2 + λ4 ) − (θ B − 1)(λ1 + λ3 )]
4

∑λ j

(3.17)

j =1

Since k m′ (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) > 0 in an interior solution, (3.16) and (3.17) imply:

(λ3 + λ4 ) ≡ S3U x′
(λ1 + λ2 ) S1U x′

i3

i1

(λ2 + λ4 ) ≡ S2U x′
(λ1 + λ3 ) S1U x′

i2
i1

+ S 4U x′ i 4

+ S 2U x′ i 2

+ S 4U x′ i 4

+ S 3U x′ i 3

> (θ A − 1)

(3.18)

> (θ B − 1)

(3.19)
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i.e., the marginal rate of substitution of consumption of each commodity between “good”
and “bad” states must be greater than the penalties for income tax evasion imposed by the
respective tax authorities. Thus, she would evade taxes from either of the tax authorities
as long as the above inequalities hold. The strict concavity of utility function U is both a
necessary and a sufficient condition to guarantee that the solutions for δm are indeed
global maximum.

Income Tax Evasion and Optimal Decision Rules

Note that the individual’s optimal choice involves substitution across three
margins: (i) for a given after-tax income from the tax authorities, the composition of her
consumption bundle on each state of nature; (ii) the usual, now disaggregated, leisureconsumption tradeoff; and (iii) the tradeoff between the benefits of evasion through
enhanced consumption possibilities and its concomitant costs (risky consumption and
concealment costs). Given the general specification of consumer preferences, these
tradeoffs are intertwined in a non-trivial way. For instance, optimal labor supply will, in
general, depend on the choice of income reports and the resulting concealment costs since
these affect the net return to work. Similarly, tax evasion behavior will, in general, be
influenced by commodity prices and non-wage income.
In order to characterize these tradeoffs, the first order conditions (A.2) through
(A.8) in Appendix A can be combined and simplified to get:

U x′ij (x j ,1 − l )

U x′kj (x j ,1 − l )

=

pi
;
pk

j = 1, 2, 3, 4; i = 1, 2, …, n and i ≠ k

(3.20)

20

−

S 3U x′ i 3 + S 4U x′ i 4

=

k ′A + t A (θ A − 1)
k ′A − t A

(3.21)

−

S 2U x′ i 2 + S 4U x′ i 4

=

k B′ + t B (θ B − 1)
k B′ − t B

(3.22)

S1U x′ i1 + S 2U x′i 2

S1U x′i1 + S 3U x′ i 3
4

−

∑ S jU l′j (x j ,1 − l)
j =1
4

∑ S jU x′ (x j ,1 − l)
j =1

=

w
[1 − t A − t B − k + (1 − δ A )k ′A + (1 − δ B )k B′ ]
pi

(3.23)

ij

Condition (3.20) implies that, conditional on an audit state, the structure of the optimal
consumption bundle is determined by equating the marginal rate of substitution between
two commodities and their respective price ratio. Thus, if the consumer knew the
outcome of audit lotteries before they are resolved, the substitution at the margin between
any two commodities would be governed by their market terms of trade. With the
uncertainty arising from tax evasion, the optimal consumption bundle will also be
affected by the terms of trading risks across audit states.
Conditions (3.21) and (3.22) which characterize optimal income tax evasion
implicitly, illustrate this result from the optimal choices of δA and δB. While the right
hand sides of these conditions show the rate of substitution between good and bad states,
the left hand sides are the slopes of the respective boundary of the budget set defined by
all feasible pairs [{( x i 3 , x i 4 ), ( x i1 , x i 2 )} and {( x i 2 , x i 4 ), ( x i1 , x i 3 )}] given the individual’s
labor supply and the tax enforcement parameters of the tax authorities A and B. These
slopes are given by the ratios of net marginal benefits of tax evasion from tax authorities
A and B in each possible state. Thus, conditions (3.21) and (3.22) imply that the
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willingness to transfer consumption of any commodity from the ‘good’ to the ‘bad’ state
must be equal to the implicit “relative price” of trading risk (income concealment from
either tax authority) and no risk (income reported truly to both the tax authorities).
Finally, condition (3.23) describes the modified optimal tradeoff between leisure
and consumption of any commodity. The ratio of the marginal utilities to leisure for
consumption of each commodity must equal the post-tax relative wage after concealment
costs are taken into account. With no evasion of taxes owed to tax authorities A and B,
(3.23) gives the usual optimality condition. With income tax evasion, the tradeoff is
affected by the marginal tax rates, the choices of δA and δB, and the concealment
technology, all of which affect the return to labor supply. With δA and δB at their optimal
levels, a higher per capita cost, ki (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) , reduces the net return to work effort.
In contrast, higher income concealment (i.e., lower values of δA and δB) reduces the
expected income tax rates and thus increases the return to labor supply. It is, thus, clear
that labor-leisure tradeoff critically hinges on the tax evasion decisions of the individual.
Given the general specification of individual preferences in our model, the
interdependence among tax evasion from the tax authorities, consumption and labor
supply determines δA and δB, which, in turn, determine how much consumption is put at
stake in audit lotteries. The choice of state contingent consumption bundle provides
numerous ways to diversify the risks of tax evasion over the n commodities. Differences
in income elasticity both across commodities and individual types intertwine the realized
consumption pattern to the tax evasion behavior. Existing complementarities between
consumption and leisure interlock an individual’s labor supply and tax evasion decisions.
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In order to illustrate these issues, consider the case of quasi-linear preferences in
consumption and leisure, so that individuals are risk neutral and income effects of audits
are immaterial. In that case (3.21) and (3.22) reduce to:

k ′A = t A [1 − (S1 + S 2 )θ A ]

(3.21′)

k B′ = t B [1 − (S1 + S3 )θ B ]

(3.22′)

These conditions imply that δA (δB) equates the marginal cost of income concealment
from tax authority A (B) to income tax evasion. Note that both of the evasion decisions
are independent of lump sum grants, pre-tax wage rate, and prices, and hence commodity
tax parameters. Since per capita concealment costs K i (.) are assumed to be the same for
all individual types, everyone evades same fraction of their income and hence faces the
same effective tax rates:

t Ae = t A [δ A + θ A (S1 + S 2 )(1 − δ A )]

(3.24)

t Be = t B [δ B + θ B (S1 + S 3 )(1 − δ B )]

(3.25)

Substituting (3.21′) and (3.22′) into (3.23) and simplifying yields:

− U l′ (1 − l ) =

[

w
1 − t Ae − t Be − k
qi

]

(3.26)

where t Ae and t Be are evaluated at the optimal values of δA and δB. This condition implies
that the optimal labor supply is determined by equating the marginal utility of leisure to
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the net expected return to work effort. Since the partial derivatives of (3.26) with respect
to δA and δB result in (3.21′) and (3.22′), labor supply is independent of tax evasion
decisions, conditional on the optimal values of δA and δB.
Note that (3.21′) and (3.22′) imply that income tax evasion will unambiguously
increase with a higher marginal income tax rate and/or a lower probability of audit by
either or both the tax authorities. These results are the two tax authority generalization of
Cremer and Gahvari (1994) and Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994). However,
these results and that δA and δB are constant across individuals dependent crucially on the
assumption of risk aversion and are yet to be supported by empirical evidence. In general,
the optimal values of δA and δB differ from the ones derived through benefit-cost
analysis, and are affected by income effects arising from changes in lump sum transfers,
commodity tax rate, income tax rates, and audit probabilities. Since the intensities of
these income effects will vary along the distribution of abilities, the propensities to evade
taxes will vary across individuals and hence will affect their consumption-leisure tradeoff
in a non-trivial way. As will be detailed later, such income effects along with the
uncertainties arising from tax evasion play a crucial role in shaping the impact of tax
evasion on optimal tax structures.

Compensated Demands, Labor Supply, and Comparative Statics

Conditional on the exogenous penalty rates, the first order conditions (A.2)
through (A.12) in Appendix A can be used to derive the corresponding commodity
demand functions xij, labor supply l and the optimal proportions of income reported, δA
and δB, for an individual as:
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(

)

xij w, p, t A , t B ,θ A ,θ B , α A , α B , σ A , σ B ; i = 1, 2,…, n; j = 1, 2,…, 4.

(

l w, p, t A , t B , θ A ,θ B , α A , α B , σ A , σ B

)

(3.27) – (3.30)

(3.31)

δ A (w, p, t A , t B ,θ A ,θ B , α A , α B , σ A , σ B )

(3.32)

δ B (w, p, t A , t B ,θ A ,θ B , α A , α B , σ A , σ B )

(3.33)

Note that while xi’s are random variables before the realization of income tax audit
lotteries, l , δA and δB are not. Commodity tax evasion parameters affect these optimal
choices through their affect on market prices. To characterize the response of individual
to changes in the policy parameters of the two tax authorities, obtain the indirect utility
function by substituting the vector of commodity demands and labor supply functions
into (3.15) as:

4

V (w, p, t A , t B , θ A , θ B , α A , α B , σ A , σ B ) = ∑ S jU j (x j (.),1 − l(.))

(3.15′)

j =1

Given the optimal choices, the following envelope results can be derived by partially
differentiating the above indirect utility function:

[

] ∑λ x

V p k = − E λ j xkj ≡ −

4

j kj

<0;

k = 1, 2, 3 ,…, n.

(3.34)

j =1

⎡
⎤
⎡ ∂y j ⎤
⎢
λ j ⎥ ≡ − wl (λ3 + λ4 )δ A + (λ1 + λ2 )(1 − θ A (1 − δ A ))⎥ < 0
Vt A = − E ⎢
⎢ 144444424444443 ⎥
∂
t
⎣ A ⎦
≡ λt A
⎣⎢
⎦⎥

(3.35)
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⎡
⎤
⎡ ∂y j ⎤
λ j ⎥ ≡ − wl ⎢(λ2 + λ4 )δ B + (λ1 + λ3 )(1 − θ B (1 − δ B ))⎥ < 0
Vt B = − E ⎢
⎢ 144444424444443 ⎥
⎣ ∂t B ⎦
≡ λt B
⎢⎣
⎥⎦

(

)

[ ]

(3.36)

4

Vα = Vα A ≡ Vα B = E λ j ≡ ∑ λ j > 0

(3.37)

j =1

4

Vσ m = ∑

∂S j

j =1 ∂σ m

U j (x j (.),1 − l(.)) < 0

; m = A, B

(3.38)

where λt A ( λt B ) denotes the change in the expected marginal utility of income due to a

(

)

change in the statutory income tax rate by tax authority A (B), Vα = Vα A ≡ Vα B is the
expected utility of certain income, and Vσ m shows the change in the expected marginal
utility of income due a change in the probability of detection by the tax authorities. As
expected, an increase in the price of the k-th good (for instance, through a higher
commodity tax and/or audit probability), or an increase in the income tax rates and
penalty rates by tax authorities A and/or B, all reduces the expected utility. However, the
impact of audit probability is ambiguous in view of the fact that higher audit probability
by one tax authority can be more than compensated for by the lower audit probability by
the other tax authority. Since with tax evasion income and thus consumption are random
variables, these expressions are just analogous to the usual expressions obtained in the
absence of uncertainty, and readily highlight the difference made by the uncertainty that
ensues with audit lotteries.
Let us derive the compensated demand and labor supply functions. Given the fact
that the choice of income reports to tax authorities A and B are not the direct sources of
utility, we may consider the tax compensated dual problem. Since the lump sum income
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(the sum of grants α = αA+ αA) is the same regardless of the outcome of audit lotteries,
the dual problem becomes:

min α = p x j − lS j w j

4

s.t.

∑ S jU j (x j ,1 − l) ≥ V *

(3.39)

j =1

Although this problem differs from the usual one in duality theory with certainty, it has
an almost similar intuitive interpretation. The optimal solution consists of the
corresponding state contingent commodity bundles, labor supply, and the proportions of
income reported to tax authorities A and B, so that the compensation required to provide
the individual with the level of utility V* be minimum. Since the individual commits to a
level of labor supply and proportions of income reports to tax authorities A and B before
the realizations of audit lotteries, it is easier to think of the solution in two stages. In the
first stage, for a fixed vector of xj, one chooses δA, δB and l based on the expected return
to labor supply wj and these determine the pre-tax labor income net of concealment costs.
In the second stage, given the optimal choices of δA, δB and l , the individual chooses the
consumption vector, xj, to minimize α. The associated Lagrangian and the first order
conditions are presented in Appendix B.
Not surprisingly, holding utility constant the individual behaves as a risk neutral
agent. Hence, the optimal income reports are determined qualitatively the same way as in
the absence of income effects (i.e., (3.21′) and (3.22′) for quasi-linear preferences).
Therefore, δ Ac and δ Bc are independent of w and consumer prices. Solving the system of
equations (B.2) through (B.9) in Appendix B yields the compensated demand
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functions, xijc , labor supply function, l c , income reports, δ Ac and δ Bc , and the expenditure

(

)

function, α w, p, t A , t B , θ A , θ B , σ A , σ B , V * . We can then define the following
equivalences using the fact that the lump sum grant α≡αA+αB is just sufficient to attain
the specified level of indirect utility:

(

)

(

xij w, p, t A , t B , θ A , θ B , σ A , σ B , α (.) ≡ xijc w, p, t A , t B , θ A , θ B , σ A , σ B , V *

(

)

(

l w, p, t A , t B , θ A , θ B , σ A , σ B , α (.) ≡ l c w, p, t A , t B , θ A , θ B , σ A , σ B , V *

)

)

(3.40)
(3.41)

δ A (w, p, t A , t B ,θ A ,θ B , σ A , σ B , α (.)) ≡ δ Ac (t A , t B ,θ A ,θ B , σ A , σ B ,V * )

(3.42)

δ B (w, p, t A , t B ,θ A ,θ B , σ A , σ B , α (.)) ≡ δ Bc (t A , t B ,θ A , θ B , σ A , σ B ,V * )

(3.43)

By the usual duality properties, we can then find the derivatives of the expenditure
function as the marginal rate of substitution of the indirect utility function. Hence, from
(3.34) through (3.38) one can derive:

4

Vp
∂α
=− k =
∂p k
Vα

∑λ
j =1

j

x kj
>0

4

∑λ
j =1

(3.44)

j

Vt
wl λ t
∂α
=− A = 4 A >0
∂t A
Vα
∑λj

(3.45)

Vt
wl λ t
∂α
=− B = 4 B >0
∂t B
Vα
∑λj

(3.46)

j =1

j =1
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4

Vσ
∂α
=− m =−
∂σ m
Vα

∂S

∑ ∂σ mj U j (x j (.),1 − l(.))
j =1

4

∑λ j

>0

m = A, B

(3.47)

j =1

Expressions (3.44) through (3.47) show the required change in the lump sum transfers
needed to compensate an individual due to marginal changes in tax instruments by the
two tax authorities so that she can still attain the level of utility V*.

Proposition 2: The optimal responses of an individual of a particular type to changes in
the tax authorities’ parameters that affect prices, the return to labor supply, and income
tax evasion are ambiguous.

Proof: See Appendix C.
As expected, unless further restrictions on preferences are imposed, it is not
possible to determine the sign of these expressions due to conflicting income and
substitution effects. Insofar as the individual can substitute across several margins such
as, across commodities, risk vis-à-vis no risk, and labor/leisure, in response to the
policies by either tax authority A and B or both, the expected utility maximization is
consistent with a variety of individual behavior. However, it may be noted that if the
proportion of declared income decreases with lump sum grant, a tighter enforcement of
the income tax laws by both the tax authorities (i.e., higher σA and/or σB), or a policy by
tax authority B that increases consumer prices (i.e., higher t i and/or σ i ) will induce
taxpayers to unambiguously report higher proportions of their true income to both the tax
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∂δ Ac
∂δ Bc
authorities. This follows from the fact that
>0 and
>0 (from differentiation of
∂σ m
∂σ m
(B.8) and (B.9) respectively) and that an increase in the price of any goods affects
evasion behaviors purely through an income effect that makes the individual relatively
poorer. In general, the signs of (C.1) through (C.16) crucially hinge on the nature of
relationship between goods, between goods and leisure, and the degree of absolute and
relative risk aversion of the individual.

THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF TAXES TO THE TAX AUTHORITIES

Multi-agency tax evasion adds new ingredients to the standard optimal taxation
problem of balancing equity and efficiency. In such a case the efficiency costs of the tax
system will not be limited to the usual excess burden of taxation. Since incomes of
individuals and sales of firms cannot be observed without costs by tax authority B,
concealment and audit costs impose an additional deadweight loss to the society. Similar
inefficiency also arises as a result of tax authority A’s inability to observe incomes of the
individuals without additional costs. Further, lack of coordination between the tax
authorities may increase the inefficiency costs that can actually be avoided. The more
acute the tax evasion by individuals and firms, the more the tax authorities may have to
divert to the enforcement of the tax laws. In addition, the efficiency costs in commodity
taxation, in terms of the distortion in the relative prices, will now depend on the evasion
behavior of firms across industries, through the differences in the technology affecting
the concealment costs. Further, multi-agency tax evasion is likely to limit the
redistributive role of the tax system since audit costs and costs that may arise due to lack
of coordination reduce the levels of transfers to individuals and thus hamper
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redistribution. Differential commodity taxation to favor the poor needs to be balanced
against the above mentioned price distortions caused by commodity taxation. Insofar as
different taxes have different evasion characteristics, the equivalence between the
observed individual incomes and consumption or even between aggregate reported
incomes and observed aggregate commodity consumption, no longer holds. Observed
individual incomes and reported sales of firms, which now constitute the total tax base,
are less reliable measures of individual welfare.
New tradeoffs emerge in the design of optimal tax policy for tax authority B. Due
to the uncertainty that comes with tax audits, the choice of taxes becomes an issue of the
extent to which revenue collection should rely more heavily on commodity taxes
collected from firms or on income tax collected from individuals. There may now be
additional social welfare gains from reducing the risk of tax evasion. Moreover, tax
policies to both tax authorities A and B are no longer exclusively concerned with
choosing optimal tax bases and the structures of taxation; as the set of instruments now
include audit probabilities, tighter enforcement or a combination of tighter enforcement
and higher tax rates or increased coordination between tax authorities A and B appears as
an alternative. Welfare gains might be obtained by targeting certain goals with particular
instruments so that the optimal policy may more likely involve a mix of taxes.
Under this backdrop let us now analyze the problems encountered by tax
authorities A and B. In doing so, we make the assumption that the penalty rates, (θA-1),
(θB-1) and (θ-1), on firms and individuals cannot be set to eradicate tax evasion fully.
The costs of audits are given by functions c A (σ A , σ B ) and c B (σ A , σ B ) for the individuals
and c(σ ) for the firms. While function c is strictly quasi-convex in all of its arguments,
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function cB is strictly increasing in σB and non-increasing in σA. Similarly, function cA is
strictly increasing in σA and non-increasing in σB. Further, we also assume that

cA(0) = cB(0) = c(0) = 0;
∂c A (σ A , σ B ) ⎛ ∂c B (σ A , σ B ) ⎞
⎜⎜ =
⎟⎟ → ∞ as σA(=σB) approaches unity.
∂
σ
∂σ A
B
⎝
⎠
∂c A (σ A , σ B ) ⎛ ∂c B (σ A , σ B ) ⎞
⎜⎜ =
⎟⎟ → 0 as σA(=σB) approaches unity.
∂σ A
∂σ B
⎝
⎠

e

In this setting, t , t Ae and t Be are of primary interest in the computation of tax revenues
accrued to tax authorities A and B. Owing to a continuum of individuals, the realized
means of the random variables are assumed to be equal to their expected values so that S1
is the fraction of individuals actually caught cheating by both the tax authorities, S2 and
S3 are the fractions of individuals caught cheating only by tax authority A and B
respectively, and S4 is the fraction of individuals never caught by either of the tax
authorities. Similarly, σ i is the fraction of firms in industry i caught cheating by the tax
authority B. We can then define:

[ (

)]

4

xi = E xij w, p, t A , t B , θ A , θ B , α A , α B , σ A , σ B = ∑ S j xij (.)

(4.1)

j =1

wh

Xi =

∫ x dF
i

(4.2)

w

wl

(

)

R A = R w, p, t A , t B , θ A , θ B , α A , α B , σ A , σ B = t Ae wl − α A

(4.3)
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n

RB = R (w, p, t A , t B , τ , θ A , θ B , θ , α A , α B , σ A , σ B , σ ) = ∑ tie xi +t Be wl − α B

(4.4)

i =1

where RA is the expected taxes net of transfers collected from an individual by tax
authorities A, and RB is the expected taxes net of transfers collected from an individual
and firm by tax authority B. Note that xij and l are given by the optimizing individual
demand and labor supply functions defined earlier and that tax collections depend on the
tax evasion behaviors of individuals and firms and the respective effective tax rates. The
‘super government’ chooses to maximize a strictly quasi-concave (indirect) social welfare

((

function H V w, p, t A , t B , θ A , θ B , α A , α B , σ A , σ B

)) subject to the respective revenue

constraints for the tax authorities. Assuming the per capita revenue requirements for tax
authorities A and B, the problem of the ‘super government’ can be stated as:

wh

∫ [H (V (w, p, t

max

A

))]

, t B ,θ A ,θ B , α A , α B , σ A , σ B dFw

(4.5)

wl
wh

s.t.

∫ [R (t
A

w

A

, t B ,θ A ,θ B , α A , α B , σ A , σ B )]dFw − c A (σ A , σ B ) = M A

(4.6)

l

wh

s.t.

∫ [RB (w, p, t A , t B , t,θ A ,θ B ,θ ,α A ,α B ,σ A ,σ B ,σ )]dFw − c(σ ) − cB (σ A ,σ B ) = M B

w

(4.7)

l

The Lagrangian and the associated first order conditions are presented in Appendix D.
Combining (3.37), (D.3) and (D.4), one can derive the expressions for the Lagrangian
multipliers of tax authority A’s and B’s revenue constraints as:
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These can be interpreted as the average social marginal utilities of certain income using
wh

⎡ ∂R ⎤
the revenues of tax authorities A and B as numeraire. As ∫ ⎢ A ⎥dFw < 0 and
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interior solution. We assume that theses conditions are satisfied. As a result, the first
order conditions imply that:
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That is, in an interior optimum there should be positive net marginal revenue from
increasing tA and σA by tax authority A and by increasing tk, tB, σB, and σk by tax
authority B. Further, tax authorities can jointly minimize their income tax audit costs
through coordination of their audit information. Otherwise, since the instruments are
distortionary, aggregate welfare could be increased by simply setting the instruments to
zero by either or both the tax authorities so as to eliminate distortion.
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These expressions and the first order conditions in (D.1) through (D.10) can be used to
characterize the level and structure of optimal taxes and audit probabilities in our
prototype economy. Since the model is non-linear the closed form solution for these key
parameters cannot be derived at this level of generalization. To what extent these
restrictions are satisfied has to be verified empirically based on data from the real world.
Nevertheless, our analytical approach is useful in illustrating the main qualitative
relationships within a logically consistent framework.

36
OPTIMAL TAX RULES UNDER TAX EVASION

Insofar as both the direct and the indirect taxes can be evaded and there are tax
authorities to enforce their tax rules, optimality involves both types of taxes to both the
tax authorities. So, we will derive expressions for optimal commodity and income taxes,
and compare them with the expressions derived for optimal commodity taxation by
Ramsey (1927) and optimal income tax rate derived by Dixit and Sandmo (1977).
Optimal Commodity Tax Rates
For the purpose of optimal commodity taxation, let us treat σ, tA, tB, σA, and σB as
fixed and substitute (3.34), (C.1) through (C.4), (4.10), and (4.18) into (D.7) to get:
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γA
, the ratio of the marginal utilities of income to tax authorities A and B
γB

modifies the usual Ramsey rule. The modified rule now takes into account not only the
type of commodities but also who are the main consumers of these goods. Further, the
modified rule clearly takes into consideration both the equity and efficiency aspects of
optimal taxation. In our setting the efficiency aspect includes the change in the expected
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tax resulting from the income effect of the lump sum transfer on income reported to the
tax authorities. Given the concavity of H and U, b w tends to be biased in favor of the low
income individuals.

Proposition 3: In an economy with linear income and commodity taxes that are subject to
random audits by multiple tax authorities, optimal commodity tax rates satisfy the
following relationship, ∀k = 1,2,..., n :
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Proof: Use (4.13) and (4.22), the symmetry of the matrix of compensated demand
functions and divide (5.1) by Xk
4

The term b w ≡

H ′∑ λ j
j =1

γB

⎛ ∂R
⎞ ⎛ ∂R
⎞
+ γ ⎜⎜ A + 1⎟⎟ + ⎜⎜ B + 1⎟⎟ in the above modified Ramsey
⎝ ∂α A
⎠ ⎝ ∂α B
⎠

rule can be termed as the net social marginal utility of certain income after taking into
account the net effect of transfers from tax authorities A and B on the expected taxes
collected from an individual. Note that b w is analogous to γh in Diamond (1975), which
plays an important role in the optimal taxation literature. It captures the weight of
individual’s ability in the social welfare function depending on how aggregate welfare
and the tax payment by the individual change with the lump sum transfer.
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The left hand side of (5.2) gives the percentage reduction in the compensated
demand for commodity xk caused by the change in the tax rate on it and is usually
referred to as “index of discouragement” à la Mirrlees (1976). The first term in the right
hand side measures the extent to which taxes are levied on goods that are consumed by
individuals with a high or low net social marginal utility of income i.e., the rich or the
poor. Recall that expression (3.44) gives the change in the lump sum transfer that is
required to compensate an individual for a price change induced by the change in the
statutory tax rates. With no income tax evasion from either tax authority, this is just xkj.
This compensation varies in accordance with the differences in consumption patterns. For
instance, low-income individuals should be compensated more when necessities are taxed
heavily. The more the k-th commodity is consumed by individuals with a high social
marginal utility of income or income elastic tax payments (i.e., high income elasticity
estimates for goods or low income elasticity estimates of labor supply and tax evasion),
the smaller the reduction in the compensated demand for xk, and the lower tends to be its
expected tax rate. Insofar as this correlation is expected to become pronounced for
necessities, (5.2) suggests that the commodities consumed by the poor should be subject
to a lower expected tax rate.
The second term reflects the marginal income tax revenue accrued to tax
authorities A and B due to the substitution effect on labor supply of a change in tk. With
no income tax evasion, such as in the usual Ramsey formula, this term is usually
subsumed in the left hand side summation. Given that commodity taxes and income taxes
levied by tax authorities A and B have different evasion characteristics, this is no longer
the case. Its sign depends on the relationship between good being taxed and labor (which
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depends on the income tax rates by tax authorities A and B). If the good being taxed and
labor supply are net complements, an efficiency loss would result due to the induced
reduction in the work effort. As a result, goods that are net complements to leisure i.e.,
net substitute for labor, should be taxed more heavily on both equity and efficiency
grounds.
The last term is a correction factor first discussed by Cremer and Gahvari (1993)
and reflects the distortions that commodity tax evasion creates in the price of the good
per unit of tax revenue collected. This distortion reflects the increase in concealment
costs in the k-th industry, and accounts for the difference between increases in t ke and pk.
The higher this term, the smaller the increase in concealment costs and less social
resources are wasted. The extended Ramsey now calls for a proportionate reduction in
compensated demand to be smaller for goods that entail the smaller evasion distortions.
Optimal Income Tax Rates
In presence of multiple tax collecting authorities, the optimal income tax rates set
by tax authorities A and B are affected by evasion in incomes and commodity taxes. It
may be noted that these tax rates are not close form solutions as there are obvious
simultaneity between the two rates due to their mutual interdependence. To see this let us
treat σ, t, σA, and σB as fixed and use (C.5) through (C.12), (D.1), (D.2), (4.11), (4.12),
(4.19), and (4.20) and manipulate to get:
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Proposition 4: With tax evasion by individuals from multiple tax authorities, the optimal
income tax rates by the tax authorities A and B are characterized implicitly by the
following formulae:
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Proof: Use (4.13) and (4.21) and the definition of b w in (5.2).
The two equations in the above proposition show the joint dependence of the
income tax rates by the both tax authorities. Even though they do not give closed form
solutions, they contain the main elements to characterize the optimal income tax policies
in this prototype economy. In order to interpret these expressions, consider the income
tax rate in the absence of income and commodity tax evasion provided by Dixit and
Sandmo (1977):
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w

where b is the corresponding analog of b w defined above and Cov(,.,) denotes the
covariance computed with respect to the ability distribution. It is easy to verify that (5.5)
and (5.6) reduce to expressions similar to (5.7) when there are no income or commodity
tax evasion, but they are not exactly the same due to inherent simultaneity in income tax
rates between tax authorities A and B. In the standard interpretation, the covariance term
in (5.7) reflects the social valuation of raising additional revenues by increasing taxes and
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distributing the proceeds uniformly across the population. In other words, it shows the
social value of a more progressive income tax. The denominator captures the welfare loss
of the tax due to the negative substitution effects on labor supply. With the concavity of
the social welfare function, the covariance term is negative so that an optimal tax solution
involves a positive income tax rate. The counterpart to (5.7) with income tax evasion
derived by Cremer and Gahvari (1994) under quasi-linear preferences is:

~
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(5.8)

where m is the amount of income concealment analogous to k (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B ) in our
prototype economy. Thus, the basic formula is corrected to include the resource cost of
income concealment. A comparison among (5.5) through (5.8) illustrates how the
presence of income and commodity tax evasion and the simultaneity of income tax rates
between tax authorities A and B affect the optimal income tax formulae.
The first two terms in the numerators of (5.5) and (5.6) are analogous to the
covariance terms in (5.7) and (5.8), accounting for the different effects that changes in tA
and tB have on the effective income tax rates t Ae and t Be across individuals. These measure
whether after accounting for differences in evasion behavior, income redistributions
benefit individuals with a low or high social marginal utility of income. Note that the first
terms in the numerators in (5.5) and (5.6) give the required compensation for the loss in
the utility caused by a higher tax rate by the concerned tax authority. In (5.7), this is
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simply given by the additional income taxes paid. With multi-agency tax evasion at work,
this is no longer a reliable measure of welfare loss of an individual since t Ae and t Be change
with δA and δB and the outcome of audit lotteries. However, this is not apparent in (5.8)
because with quasi-linear preferences, the proportion of income reported and
hence t Ae and t Be are constant across individuals. This is the key difference between the
results of this essay and those derived by Cremer and Gahvari (1994). The second terms
are the average marginal tax collections, also modified to account for differences in the
taxes paid by individuals due to multi-agency income tax evasion. The third terms reflect
the differences made by the presence of commodity taxes. These terms capture the effect
of changes in the marginal tax rate by the respective tax authority on the marginal excess
burden of existing commodity taxes as measured by the induced change in indirect tax
revenue. Due to the negative semi-definiteness of the Slutsky substitution matrix, these
terms are positive, so that the presence of commodity taxes tend to make optimal income
tax rate by either authorities higher in order to compensate for the loss in commodity tax
revenue to tax authority B.
The terms in the denominators measure the welfare losses of income taxation due
to substitution effects, which now involve distortions in labor supply and the additional
costs of income concealment from the tax authorities. Other things remaining the same,
the higher the compensated labor supply and evasion responses to changes in tA and tB,
the higher the efficiency costs of redistribution. Higher concealment costs tend to call for
lower optimal tax rates relative to the case of no income tax evasion whatsoever.
Given that the denominators in (5.5) and (5.6) are negative and H(.) is strictly
concave, a positive marginal tax rate requires that the numerators are negative. This will
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be the case as long as there are net positive distributional gains from linear income
taxation. This, in turn, requires that an increase in tA (tB) causes t Ae ( t Be ) to increase more
∂δ Ac ∂δ B
(
) is ‘large’ and positive. This would be the
for higher ability individuals and/or
∂t B ∂t A
c

case if δA (δB) strictly decreases with w, i.e., if the high ability individuals conceal a
lower proportion of their income.

Tax Mix and Uniform Taxation: Some Specific Results

Expressions (5.2), (5.5), and (5.6) make it clear that the presence of evasion in
commodity and the income taxes set by tax authorities affects the structure of direct and
indirect taxation. In order to grasp the difference that each of the three components of
evasion makes, let us consider some special cases in which the above formulae reduce to
familiar expressions in literature. Of particular interest for the issues of uniform taxation
and the optimal tax mix is the result of Deaton (1979). He shows that when preferences
are weakly separable between leisure and goods with linear Engel curves, optimal tax
system involves either (i) a linear income tax or (ii) equivalently uniform commodity
taxes accompanied by a lump sum transfer. We will examine its robustness in the
presence of multi-agency tax evasion.
Consider first the case that firms do not evade commodity taxes but individuals do
evade their income taxes owed to authorities A and B. We thus have t ie = t i , ∀i and the
last term in (5.2) is equal to 1. Then, it might seem that optimality calls for a zero
marginal income tax rate by tax authority B and the use of commodity taxes along with
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the lump sum transfer for redistribution. By adjusting the vector of commodity tax rates
so as to raise the same revenue as with the income tax in place, social welfare could be
potentially improved in two ways: (i) eliminating the wasteful costs of income
concealment and the costs of audits, and (ii) eliminating the uncertainty that ensues with
income tax audit lotteries. This would allow a higher lump sum transfer or lower
commodity taxation, and would eliminate the utility costs that audit lotteries impose on
risk-averse individuals.
Nevertheless, at this level of generalization, this result could not be immediately
established. With multi-agency income tax evasion, t Ae and t Be vary across individuals so
that the features of the multi-agency income tax system cannot be trivially reproduced by
a uniform commodity tax that resembles a wage tax. If low ability individuals evade a
higher proportion of their income than their high ability counterparts, reported income
will still provide somewhat reliable signals of the rankings of true income. Since
t Ae and t Be will then be lower for low ability individuals, taxes would carry some
information about the ability of individual types. Income tax evasion could then be served
as passive “screening” devices to sift the low ability individuals from their high ability
counterparts relaxing the information constraints faced by the tax authorities. With tax
evasion the income tax systems operate as a non-linear tax schedule. It is then possible
that evasion lowers both marginal and the average tax rates faced by low-income
individuals and thus increase the progressivity of the income taxes. If these redistributive
benefits outweigh the above welfare costs, then the optimal tax structure could still
involve a mix of income and commodity taxes.
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Obviously, if high ability individuals tend to have high δA and δB, the optimal
policy involves sole reliance on commodity taxation. In this case, as indicated before, the
numerators of (5.5) and (5.6) would be positive and tA = tB = 0 is the optimal tax solution.
Therefore, if high ability individuals evade proportionately more and evasion of
commodity taxes is unimportant, then increasing reliance on commodity taxation
approximates the “optimal” policy prescription set forth by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund for the developing countries.
In contrast, as long as tA >0 and/or tB > 0, even without commodity tax evasion, it
cannot be immediately presumed from (5.2) that commodity tax rates should be uniform.
This again follows from the aforementioned non-equivalence between a wage tax and
uniform commodity tax in this prototype economy. Since δA and δB and hence t Ae and
t Be vary with w, tax evasion introduces non-linear features into the income tax, which can

be favorable to redistribution and are not trivially reproduced by commodity taxation.
Moreover, individuals pay different proportions of their income in taxes regardless of
their consumption patterns. If we allow, as Cremer and Gahvari (1994) did, individuals to
pre-commit a given level of consumption of certain commodities regardless of the
outcome of the tax audits, the optimal tax system would then involve a mix of
differentiated commodity taxes together with an income tax for tax authority B. Hence,
the advocacy of tax practitioners in developing countries for a heavier reliance on
uniform commodity taxation cannot be justified on the grounds of differences in the
evasion characteristics of taxes that favor commodity taxation.
Consider now the opposite situation where only commodity taxes are subject to
evasion. Let us re-examine two specific results in the literature that make a case for
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uniform commodity taxation: (i) exogenous (or untaxed) labor income and (ii)
independent commodity demands. Using dots to refer to the value of the variables
without income tax evasion, we can rewrite (5.2) as:
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This is analogous to the optimal commodity tax rule obtained by Cremer and Gahvari
(1993) for a representative consumer in a prototype economy of heterogeneous taxpayers
with linear income taxes by A and B are in place. As we will see, most of their results
generalize to the case where equity concerns are incorporated and a linear income tax is
among the policy instruments for tax authority B. The left hand term—the index of
discouragement—reflects the Ramsey efficiency arguments for taxing inelastic goods
more heavily. The covariance term is negative if xk is a normal good and lower in
absolute value for necessities; it reflects the equity concerns embodied in the social
welfare function. On efficiency grounds the demand for the necessities should then be
discouraged less by increased taxation. The last term is the distortion caused by
commodity tax evasion in industry k.
When income is endogenous, we are back to a second best situation. As (5.2′)
reveals, there is no a priori presumption that an optimal solution involves zero
commodity tax rates, i.e., sole reliance on the linear income tax for tax authority B. More
often then not differences in evasion behavior across industries tend to make optimal

48
commodity tax rates non-uniform; instead an optimal mix of differentiated taxes emerges
(Cremer and Gahvari 1993).
When labor income is untaxed by the authority B, Deaton’s (1979) result – with
weak separability between leisure and consumption along with identical linear Engel
curves, income tax suffices – applies. In this case, the consumption pattern is the same for
all commodities across the individuals, i.e.,

&x&k
is the same for ∀k , so that commodity
X&&
k

sales carry no information about individuals’ ability and differentiated commodity
taxation can serve no redistributive role. In this case commodity tax evasion compounds
the deadweight loss by adding the concealment and audit costs by tax authority B. In the
general case, even though commodity taxes may still play a redistributive role, any such
redistributive benefits have to outweigh the efficiency losses caused by concealment and
audit costs by B.
It may be recalled that in the absence of commodity tax evasion and when
commodity demands depend only on own price so that

∂xi
= 0, ∀i ≠ k , optimal
∂p k

commodity tax follows the so-called “inverse elasticity rule” when there is no commodity
tax evasion and when commodity demands depend only on own price. Letting ε kk be the
absolute value of the average compensated own price elasticity of the k-th good, from
(5.2′) we obtain:
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In the absence of commodity tax evasion, this is simply the ratio of the “social luxury
index” of x k (which calls for a lower price on necessities) and its compensated own price
elasticity (which calls for a lower tax on such commodities). Deaton (1979) argues that
since under additive preferences luxuries tend to be price elastic and necessities price
inelastic, redistributive forces calling for a lower tax on necessities shown by the
covariance term in (5.9) are offset by the efficiency pressure for a higher tax suggesting
an approximate uniform tax solution. With commodity tax evasion, the result necessarily
refers to the expected tax rate and setting the statutory tax rates and audit probabilities to
be equal would not suffice to guarantee the result. This would now depend on whether
the distortions of commodity tax evasion are greater in industries producing necessities or
in industries producing luxuries. This, in turn, depends on the differences of the
concealment cost technology. Since there is no a priori presumption of correlation
between concealment costs and the elasticity of demand, the optimality of uniform
commodity taxation is highly unlikely.
Finally, once redistributive concerns are introduced, it is not possible to conclude
that with equal price responsiveness tax evasion increases the expected commodity tax of
the good subject to evasion as in Cremer and Gahvari (1993). Fulfillment of the condition
would now require the equality of the covariance term for both goods.
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TAX EVASION AND PROGRESSIVITY OF INCOME TAXES

The foregoing analysis suggests that income tax evasion calls for lower marginal
income tax rates set by tax authorities A and B and thus make linear income tax systems
set by both the tax authorities less progressive. However, formulae in (5.5) and (5.6) give
only implicit solutions. At this level of generalization it is impossible to make any
specific conclusion. To derive specific conclusions we follow Cremer and Gahvari
(1994): comparing the behavior of social welfare as tA and/or tB change with and without
tax evasion. To this end we use quasi-linear preferences U(c, 1- l ) = c + f(1- l ) where c is
a composite commodity with price normalized to unity. Using the results derived earlier,
one can get the following simplified results:
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With these results the expressions in (5.5) and (5.6) is simplified to:
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(5.6′)

Since individuals are now risk-neutral, the marginal utility of income is constant.
Everybody chooses the same amount of income to report ( δ A and δ B ) so that t Ae and t Be
are again constant. It is then evident that labor supply increases unambiguously with the
earning potential of individuals, so does the pre-tax income. Income reports become a
reliable indicator of individual’s well-being so that the numerators are unambiguously
negative. The linear income taxes by tax authorities A and B will then be clearly
progressive in that average tax rates increase with pre-tax income, exhibit properties
closer to those in the absence of tax evasion. Nevertheless, one cannot infer whether tA
and tB should be smaller than their counterparts in the absence of tax evasion. While
marginal concealment costs still add to the social deadweight loss, the effect of tax
evasion on the marginal excess burdens are ambiguous as both the level and elasticity of
labor supply are affected by tax evasion. Since income differs with and without tax
evasion, even in the most favorable conditions considered so far, a restriction on the
shape of the social welfare function will not suffice to conclude that tax evasion lowers
the progressivity of the income taxes.
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The difference between these findings and those of Cremer and Gahvari (1994)
may be attributed to the specification of the concealment technology. Cremer and
Gahvari (1994) allowed the probability of being caught to depend on the amount and
proportion of income concealed as well as the amount spent in concealment.
Nevertheless, their results on progressivity are derived under the special case when
probability is not affected by the proportion of income evaded. With this restriction, labor
supply is not affected by tax evasion. Since evasion behavior and concealment
technology are independent of pre-tax income, everybody chooses to evade the same
amount and spend the same in concealment. The probability of being caught is then
effectively the same for everyone. Labor supply is unambiguously higher for high-ability
individuals. High-income individuals evade a lower proportion of their income than their
low-income counterparts and thus face higher effective marginal tax rates. Given that
individuals evade the same amount and labor supply is not affected by evasion,
concealment and audit costs make everyone worse off. Under these circumstances, it is
not surprising that a lesser concern for redistribution embodied in the social welfare
function leads to a less progressive tax system.
In our prototype economy, concealment technology consists of constant
probability of being caught by tax authorities A or B or both but the concealment costs
are proportional to the amount evaded. Individuals pick the same proportion of income to
evade rather than the absolute amount; this then affects the leisure-consumption trade
offs. In contrast to Cremer and Gahvari (1994), the proportions of income concealed turn
out to be the same for everyone as well as the expected tax rates, but the high-income
individuals evade more in absolute terms and pay higher concealment costs. Further, the
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lower effective tax rates cause optimal labor supply to be higher in the presence of tax
evasion. Additional assumptions are then required to resolve the ambiguities regarding
the differences in the levels of lump sum transfers and marginal social welfare. Still, in
the most favorable scenario, even though δ A and δ B are the same for everyone so that
reported income still increases with pre-tax income, there remains the question of
whether tax evasion makes the tax base a less reliable measure of well-being.
The forgoing analysis implies that it is not possible to come up with clear-cut
statements regarding the effect of tax evasion on the progressivity of linear income tax
system. Such statements are even more elusive under more general structures of
individual preferences where income effects are important. The analysis does, however,
point out some of the important elements involved. It does not follow that the social
welfare loss imposed by concealment and audit costs necessarily makes the society worse
off. It is possible that for tax evasion to have a positive impact on welfare through
redistributions in the excess burden of the existing taxes. The impact on aggregate
welfare would depend on the shape of the distribution of skills and how tax evasion and
the concomitant concealment costs vary across the population.

THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE TAX BASE

An important aspect of our explicit modeling of the uncertainty that entails tax
evasion is that the set of tax policy instruments now includes the audit probabilities,
which provide an alternative way to raise revenues for the tax authorities. For instance,
by increasing the audit probabilities and thus reducing the expected return to commodity
tax evasion, tax authority B can induce firms to report a higher proportion of their sales
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and can therefore increase revenue collections with lower tax rates. Since enforcement is
costly and also causes distortions, it is important to characterize the trade offs involved in
choosing these various alternatives.
The Optimum Enforcement of Commodity Taxes
Using (D.8), (4.17) and (4.25) and undertaking similar simplifications that led to
(5.2), we obtain an equivalent expression for the Ramsey rule in terms of audit
probabilities:
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The close resemblance of this expression to (5.2) comes without surprise. An increase in
audit probability in the k-th industry raises the expected tax rate on xk at the cost of
distorting the price of the good and at an additional audit cost which adds to social
deadweight loss. The third term of this expression is thus analogous to the tax evasion
distortion term discussed earlier. It captures the distortion that tighter enforcement creates
in the price of xk per unit of tax revenue collected net of audit costs. It is evident that tk
and σ k represent closely substitute instruments for tax authority B to raise commodity tax
revenue.

Proposition 5: The optimal trade off between higher commodity tax rates and tighter
enforcement of commodity tax laws is characterized by the following relationship
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Proof: Use (5.2) and (5.10) above.

This is exactly the result derived by Cremer and Gahvari (1993) in a
representative consumer economy with no linear income tax. It simply says that, for
optimality, the changes in commodity tax rates and audit probabilities that result in an
increase of $1 in prices should yield the expected per unit increase in net tax revenue.
The fact that the rule remains intact in this considerably more general setting means that
the trade offs between higher tax rates and tighter enforcement of sales tax laws are not
affected by equity considerations or tax evasion of income. The optimal policy is guided
only by efficiency considerations in terms of how tax rates and audit probabilities affect
the costs of output concealment and thus consumer prices.

The Optimum Enforcement of Income Taxes

Slemrod (1994) argues that the issue of the optimal progressivity of the income
tax and the optimal enforcement of the tax system is intertwined. Earlier we found that,
ceteris paribus, optimal income tax rates would tend to be lower the higher the costs of

income concealments and the more elastic the response of δ A and δ B to changes in tA and
tB. These two parameters are clearly a function of the audit probabilities σ A and σ B and
therefore of the resources spent on audits. Audit policy offers an alternative means to
increase expected tax revenue collections by discouraging income tax evasion. Under
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random audits, this is achieved by setting the constant probabilities of audit. In contrast to
the income tax rates, audit policy has an associated direct cost in addition to the indirect
costs of any distortionary effects on individual and firm behavior. On the other hand,
because of risk-aversion, there are social benefits from a higher audit probability
resulting from the reduction of the risk of tax lotteries. Setting the optimal audit
probability involves balancing these costs and benefits for different type of taxpayers. In
order to evaluate this question closely, one can characterize optimal audit probabilities by
holding σ , t , t A , and t B constant. Using (D.5), (D.6), (4.15), (4.16), (4.23), and (4.24),
one can implicitly solve for σA and σB as function of t A , and t B along with other
parameters and see how tax rates are affected as the audit probabilities change. However,
at this level of generalization, it is not possible to give closed form solutions and hence
any definitive conclusion again begs for empirical verification.

CONCLUSIONS

In this essay we have extended the recent literature on the role of tax evasion in
the design of an optimal tax system. We examined how the optimal mix and the
characteristics of linear income and differentiated commodity taxes are affected in the
presence of evasion by competitive firms and individuals (from tax authorities A and B)
under uncertainty of random audits. Several important lessons were learned from the
analysis.
First, the introduction of multi-agency tax evasion sensibly affects the orthodox
prescriptions of the optimal tax literature. The standard optimal tax formulae should be
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modified in such a way as to account for the impact of multi-agency tax evasion and
audits. Further, the usual restrictions on individual preferences generally do not suffice to
render either form of taxation as useless. In contrast to the current paradigm, we find that
the presence of both income and commodity tax evasion makes a strong case for
differentiated commodity taxation. Hence, we find little justification for the prescription
based on the “Washington Consensus” that developing countries should rely heavily on
uniform commodity taxation on grounds of differences in tax compliance. Insofar as
differential tax rates can help minimize the differential price distortions created by
commodity tax evasion, uniform commodity taxes are sub-optimal when concealment of
sales varies across industries. Eventually, the optimal tax system involves a mix of linear
income and differentiated commodity taxes.
Second, the expansion of the range of tax authorities’ instruments through
inclusion of independent audits and sharing of audit information bring important changes
to optimal tax policy. In essence, as a direct mechanism to control tax evasion, audit
probabilities together with sharing information offer alternative ways to raise revenues so
that some optimal trade offs with tax rates emerge. By directly affecting tax evasion and
the concomitant concealment, audit policies and information sharing affect the responses
of taxpayers to changes in tax policies. Any level of revenues by tax authorities A and B
can now be achieved through a combination of taxes, audits and information sharing.
Further, in the case of income tax evasion, independent audits and sharing of audit
information offer a direct welfare enhancing mechanism by reducing individuals’
exposure to audit risks.
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Third, we find little justification for the prevailing orthodoxy that tax evasion
calls for lower optimal marginal tax rates and reduce the progressivity of income taxes.
However, these results seem to critically hinge on modeling evasion of income taxes and
the associated concealments. Our formulation allows evasion to affect directly the terms
of labor-leisure trade off. Further, whether tax evasion affects negatively the
distributional properties of the income taxes depends on the shape of the distributional
skills of individuals and how the proportions of income concealed varies across the
taxpayers.
The issues dealt with in this essay can be expanded to several directions. First, it
would be theoretically interesting to analyze the issues using a game-theoretic approach.
As several studies found, tax authorities do not pre-commit the audit rules but base such
decisions depending on the nature and extent of returns filed by the taxpayers. Second,
our model is based on competitive market structure. While this assumption is analytically
tractable it does not fit well with real world data especially from the developing
countries. It would be interesting to explore the commodity tax evasion under various
non-competitive market structures. Third, it would be interesting to see if and how our
conclusions change once expected utility maximization is replaced by generalized nonexpected utility or prospect theory. Fourth, it would be of primary policy interest to
conduct simulations of the model in order to quantify the parameters highlighted in the
essay.

ESSAY II: SPATIALITY AND PERSISTENCE IN THE U.S. INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE

INTRODUCTION

The income tax system in the United States operates on a self-assessment basis.
Individuals annually determine their tax liability and pay whatever they deem due. In the
course of time taxpayers learn more about the tax system, especially about the loopholes
of the tax code. Individuals also can and possibly do communicate with other filers in
filing their own returns. Insofar as the taxpayers may recall their own past filing
experience and may communicate with other taxpayers, these issues provide a rough
basis to shape the nature and extent of this year’s reporting amount. Thus, two interesting
phenomena emerge from past reporting experience and exchange of information and
experience with other filers: one of them relates to the dynamic behavior of the taxpayer;
the other shapes the nature and extent of spatial dependence.
If the individual got away with tax evasion in the past, she may tend to evade
more this year. If she was audited and caught cheating by the IRS in the past, she may
tend to evade less this year. In either case this year’s tax evasion decision is shaped by the
past evasion experience. There is, thus, an element of persistence in individual income
tax evasion in the United States. Dubin (2004) gives another explanation for the possible
persistence in tax evasion. He argues, “…taxpayers may adjust their reported taxes based
on a mixture of taxes reported in the previous year and the optimal level of taxes due
based on existing or current conditions.” He cites delayed audit completion cycle as a
possible reason for the presence of persistence.
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There are several possible explanations of the second phenomenon. Given that
taxpayers usually exchange their experience with each other, they influence and are
influenced by the tax evasion behavior of the other taxpayers. However, the precise
nature of interaction between the taxpayers with regard to evasion decision hinges on the
nature of enforcement by the IRS; if the enforcement of tax codes is strict in the sense
that they have a target revenue collection in mind, then higher evasion by one taxpayer
should be followed by lower evasion by the other, thereby resulting in a negative
relationship. If, instead the enforcement of the tax codes were lax, then a higher evasion
by one taxpayer would follow non-negative evasion by the other taxpayer. In view of the
declining audit rates by the IRS over the years, the latter scenario seems more plausible
than the former. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between the reporting behaviors
of two taxpayers.
There is a possible alternative explanation for the above interdependence
phenomenon. Suppose the IRS has a fixed amount of revenue in mind. In that case, if one
of the taxpayers successfully evaded more of her tax liability it increases the probability
of being audited of the other taxpayer. In this case the dependence comes through the
probability function and leads to a negative relationship in the reporting behaviors of two
taxpayers.
Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999) provide another explanation of the
interdependence of tax compliance. They argue that “… an individual will comply as
long as he or she believes that compliance is the social norm. Conversely, if
noncompliance becomes pervasive then the social norm of compliance disappears.” They
test this paradigm with experimental data and find substantive evidence. Their argument
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and the experimental findings also imply that there is a positive relationship between the
reporting behaviors of two taxpayers.
There is a third explanation based on experimental evidence by Manski (1991).
He argues that individuals faced with dynamic stochastic decision problems that pose
immense computational challenges may simply look to others to infer satisfactory
policies. McFadden (2006) argues that interpersonal dependence “… works through …
learning by imitating rather than learning by doing. … (P)rimary information … come(s)
from others, through observation, advice, and association. … In addition to providing
information, social networks may discipline the behavior of members through consensus
on social norms, accountability of choices, and sanctions for behavior that violates
norms.”
These twin issues of persistence and spatial dependence, albeit with their
importance, are never raised in the theoretical models nor tested in the empirical analyses
of income tax evasion. This essay will, thus, succinctly extend the original AllinghamSandmo-Yitzhaki model of income tax evasion by incorporating the above twin issues. It
will also test the empirical validity of these issues in the context of the U.S. federal
individual income tax evasion. As will be reviewed later in this essay, several empirical
studies have been conducted to assess the determinants of income tax evasion in the U.S.
However, if either of the issues has had any role in shaping the magnitude and growth of
income tax evasion, then those results were biased and/or inconsistent. Hence, any policy
prescription based of those results will be misleading.
The “tax gap” attributable to individual income tax has grown from $29 billion in
1973 to $81 billion in 1981. It was reduced to $70 billion in 1985 before jumping to $95
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billion in 1992. According to various IRS sources, the annual tax gap is estimated to be
$345 billion, or about 10 percent of what is collected each year from individuals and
businesses. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that three-quarters of this tax
gap is attributable to individual taxpayers. At that rate, individuals currently represent
$260 billion of the tax gap, which is close to triple the level estimated in 1985. The rising
loss in tax revenues due to non-compliance has drawn attention of the policymakers. The
successive U.S. governments have taken several measures to reduce this ever-yawning
gap. In the light of apparent magnitude and growth of the tax gap, the time seems right to
reassess the determinants of individual income tax evasion. These issues will also warrant
some modifications of the original Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model of income tax
evasion.
The essay is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the past
studies conducted on individual income tax compliance. Section 3 extends the original
Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model by incorporating persistence and spatiality. Section 4
deals with data and related methodological issues. Section 5 discusses the methods
employed in the empirical work and analytical issues related to the construction of
variables. Section 6 presents the descriptive statistics and the estimation results where the
spatiality and persistence issues are examined separately. The final section summarizes
the findings, discusses their implications, and suggests areas for further research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

After the seminal works by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Srinivasan (1973),
and Yitzhaki (1974), theoretical work on tax evasion has progressed in leaps and bounds.
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In contrast, the empirical literature has been thwarted primarily due to lack of data on tax
evasion. We focus on those studies that directly link to our point of departure set forth in
the Introduction. Further, we confine our analysis to the empirical studies. In doing so,
we divide the review into two sections: cross-sectional studies and time-series studies.
Cowell (1990), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein(1998), Alm (1999), and Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2002) provide summaries of literature on tax evasion from both the theoretical
and empirical fronts. Also, we confine ourselves within the purview of individual income
tax evasion as opposed to corporate income tax or sales tax evasion.
Cross-section Studies

The empirical dimension of tax evasion literature started with Clotfelter (1983)
based on the 1969 TCMP data. He divides the income tax returns into three broad groups:
non-business returns, non-farm business returns, and farm returns and estimates a tobit
model, explaining, for each group, noncompliance as a function of the combined federal
and state marginal income tax, after-tax auditor-adjusted gross income, and set of
demographic variables available on tax returns. The most striking conclusions are: (i) net
income and marginal tax rates positively affect evasion; (ii) wages as proportion of
adjusted gross income (AGI) and interests and dividends also as proportions of AGI
negatively affect how an individual underreports. Note that his finding on the effects of
marginal tax rates is inconsistent with the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model. Married
taxpayers were found to underreport more than the single taxpayers.
Witte and Woodbury (1985) aggregate the 1969 TCMP data at the three-digit zip
code level. They discuss how direct audit, audit of the other classes, multiple penalty and
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progressive tax structures together with community characteristics affect individual
income tax evasion. Using SURE estimation method they find that taxpayers evade less
as lagged direct audit rate increases. They argue that increase in any of the three measures
of penalty discourages evasion if the taxpayers are risk neutral or risk averse. They also
find that tax evasion is positively related to “opportunities” for evasion and related to
income in a non-linear way, with non-compliance at its highest at both very low and very
high levels of income. Their finding of positive association between information
reporting and taxpayer compliance provides a strong empirical support to the TEFRA
1982.
Slemrod (1985) studies the issue of primary and secondary tax evasion based on
one-fourth of the data from stratified random sample of the U.S. Treasury File for 1977.
He uses an index of the presence of evasion to position taxable income with the fiftydollar bracket and regresses dummies for fungible items, age, and marital status together
with adjusted gross income and marginal tax rate. He finds that the tendency to evade
taxes is associated with higher marginal tax rates, the presence of fungible items, being
less than 65 year of age and being married. If income is added to the list of regressors, the
coefficient of the marginal tax rate switches sign from positive to negative. However,
none of the coefficient estimates are precise. His estimates, thus, fail to distinguish the
tax effect from the income effect. Besides, his comparison of models’ coefficients with
and without income variable is inconsistent with basic econometrics in that if income is a
valid regressor then estimates in column 1 of his Table 3 biased and estimates in column
2 are correct. But if income is not relevant, then coefficient estimates of column 2 are not
efficient.
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Poterba (1987) uses one observation from each of the 1965, 1969, 1973, 1976,
1979, 1982 TCMP data sets. He discusses how the marginal tax rate affects capital gains
tax evasion. He finds that a decrease in the marginal income tax rate discourages evasion,
even though the coefficient estimate is not precise. However, with six observations and
three parameters to be estimated, any inference is highly unreliable.
Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1988) use five of the seven groups of the 1969 TCMP
data aggregated at the three-digit zip code level. Using 2SLS, they estimate three separate
equations for reported AGI, reported tax liability, and the log odds of an audit. They find
that the deterrence effect of audit is small and it is more effective for detecting income
subtractions than the report of income itself. One notable omission of their work is the
marginal tax rate. Further, their use of 2SLS to deal with the simultaneity problem is not
convincing; more could be gained by utilizing the system GMM estimation method.
Tauchen, Beron, and Witte (1989) apply the same technique on the 1979 TCMP
individual data and find similar results. Additionally, they find that the “ripple effect” of
audit is many times higher than the revenue yields from the direct audit.
Dubin and Wilde (1988) divide the 1969 TCMP data set into seven audit classes.
They discuss whether the IRS audit rate is endogenous and, if so, how it affects evasion
among these audit classes. They use the IRS budget as an instrument variable to estimate
taxpayers’ compliance behavior equation. They find that the audit rate is an endogenous
variable in four of the seven audit classes. Moreover, the effect of the IRS auditing
strategies outweighs the deterrent effect in three of the four cases in which audit rates are
endogenous.
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Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1990) develop a model to discuss how public policies
affect taxpayers’ evasion and avoidance behavior. Policy variables include marginal tax
rates, payroll tax contributions and benefits, probability of auditing, and penalty rules.
They use 1983 Jamaican micro level data to estimate the share equations for the tax bases
that rise with higher benefits for payroll tax collections and falls with higher marginal tax
rates. Further, tax bases also fall with more severe penalties and a higher audit probability
as individuals substitute avoidance for evasion.
Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1991) use 1983 Jamaican micro level data to discuss how
the self-employed people evade income tax in response to policy changes. They find that
a lower marginal income tax rate deters evasion. Moreover, fraction of income declared
by the self-employed people increases less than that of their actual income.
Feinstein (1991) adopts a “fractional detection model,” which captures the fact
that IRS examiners can detect some (but perhaps not all) of income tax evasion. He uses
a small portion of the individual-level data from the 1982 and 1985 TCMP data sets. He
discusses how income, marginal tax rate, and various socioeconomic characteristics of
the filers affect tax evasion and finds that the both the likelihood and magnitude of
evasion increases with taxpayers’ income and the marginal tax rate when he uses the two
TCMP data sets separately.
Kamdar (1995) examines the importance of information reporting on the tax
compliance of individuals using data from the 1971 TCMP. He estimates separate
compliance equations for incomes subject to differential reporting requirements and find
that third-party information reporting is an important deterrent to noncompliance.
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Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) examine the theoretical and empirical
implications of accounting for multiple modes of tax evasion we use the 1985 TCMP to
estimate an empirical model with two modes of evasion and find that increased
enforcement effort has a positive effect on compliance in the targeted mode, a negative
effect in the untargeted mode, and a positive overall effect on tax compliance.
Time-series Studies

Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987) use 2SLS method to estimate the determinants
of tax evasion based the state-level data in the Annual Report 1977-85. They use the IRS
budget per return and the percentage of income tax returns filed to total tax returns filed
as instruments for the audit rate. Further, they use “percentage of individual income tax
returns per audit” (i.e., “the amount of penalty” over the “total collections from individual
income tax”) as a measure of taxpayers’ noncompliance. Their explanatory variables are
as follows: the lagged audit rate, the lagged socioeconomic variables such as the
unemployment rate, the percentage of adult population with a high school education, per
capita income, per capita income squared, the percentage of population over 45, the
percentage of population employed in the manufacturing, and time trend. They find that
the following variables positively affect taxpayers’ noncompliance (at the 1 percent
significance level): the percentage of adult population with a high school education, per
capita income, time trend, and the predicted lagged audit rate. The last one implies that
the IRS audit rate is endogenously determined. In contrast, “the unemployment rate” and
the “per capita income squared” negatively affect “the percentage return per audit” at the
1 percent significance level. Finally, the actual lagged audit rate negatively affects (but
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only at the 20 percent significance level) “the percentage return per audit.” This implies
that an increase in the audit rate deters evasion. However, the deterrent effect is
dominated by the effect of the IRS effort on auditing.
There are some notable problems in Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987). First, they
use eight years’ state-level data, which is perhaps not enough to capture the
interdependent actions of the taxpayers and the IRS. Second, they should not include
employment taxes in calculating total collections of individual income tax. They made
this mistake because the Annual Report does not separate the employment tax from the
individual income tax at the state-level. Third, more importantly, their dependent
variable, “the percentage return per audit” is inappropriate to reflect how much a taxpayer
evades. It should be replaced by “penalty per return examined”, which conforms to the
theoretical model of Allingham-Sandmo as amended by Yitzhaki. Finally, they neglected
the information on the sources of individual income presented in the Individual Income
Tax Returns (later in the Statistics of Income Bulletin), which is more relevant than some

of their states’ characteristics variables. Finally, their model is incomplete in that it does
not consider the effect of marginal tax rate on evasion.
Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) also use 2SLS method to discuss the same issue
raised in Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987): the overall role of audit rates in the Federal
revenue collections process. Their data sources are the Annual Report 1977-1986 and the
Individual Income Tax Returns (later in the Statistics of Income Bulletin). They consider

that audits may have “spillover” effects. The “spillover” effects mean that people report
more taxes when they believe audits are more likely, no matter whether they are actually
audited or not. They use “the IRS budget per return” and “number of information returns
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other than W-2 form filed divided by total number of returns” as instruments for the audit
rate equation. They use “the reported taxes per returns filed” in the Individual Income
Tax Returns as a measure of taxpayers’ compliance. The explanatory variables include:

the current audit rate, socioeconomic variables and a time dummy. The socioeconomic
variables can be decomposed into three types, the first of which is only related to the tax
base. It includes: the percentage of population over 65, total number of households on
welfare divided by the total number of households, and total number of households
divided by the number of population. The second one is only related to taxpayers’
compliance behavior. It includes: the percentage of adult population with a school
education, the percentage of the workforce employed in manufacturing, total number of
farms divided by total population, the percentage of labor force in a service industry. The
third one is related to both the tax base and taxpayers’ compliance behavior. It includes:
per capita income, the unemployment rate, and the average state income tax rate. Their
findings are as follows: per capita income positively affects the reported taxes per return
filed (at the 1 percent significance level). In contrast, the following variables negatively
affect the reported taxes per return filed (at the 10 percent significance level): total
number of farms divided by total population, the percentage of the work force employed
in service industry, the state income tax rate, and the unemployment rate. Finally, the
audit rate is an endogenous variable and is positively related to reported taxes per return
filed.
Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) also suffer from some notable shortcomings.
First, they still neglect information on the sources of taxable income in the Individual
Income Tax Returns (later in the Statistics of Income Bulletin). Second, they may bias
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their results when they include “per capita income as an explanatory variable. We never
observe the “actual income” in the aggregate-level data. When we use “per capita
income” as a proxy for “actual income”, the effects of other variables on “the reported
taxes per return filed” may be masked. This is because “per capita income” and “the
reported taxes per return filed” are highly positively correlated but may not be causally
linked. Finally, it is impossible to separate the tax base effect from the compliance effect
on “the reported taxes per return filed” for the third type of socioeconomic variables.
Plumley (1996) extends the analysis in Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) using the
state-level data from 1982 to 1991. He modifies some of the compliance equations by
incorporating the income and offsets equations and the ratio of tax returns filing to
expected filings. He is the first to show that criminal investigation enforcement activities
are significant and positively related to compliance.
Dubin (2004) uses the state-level data between 1988 and 2001 to discuss the
effects of criminal investigation enforcement activities on taxpayers’ compliance
behavior. This is perhaps the only study that tries to explore one of the issues we will be
investigating later in our empirical analysis. Using the dynamic panel estimation method,
he concludes that criminal investigation activities have a measurable and significant
effect on voluntary tax compliance. While incarceration and probation have the most
significant effect on compliance, sentenced cases and media attention do not seem to
have any significant influence.
The past studies, even without the above two crucial issues, present conflicting
evidence as to the relative importance of sanctions, audit rates, and marginal tax rates on
tax compliance. In general, sanctions are negatively related to evasion in the theoretical
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models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo 1972), but are often statistically
insignificant in empirical studies (Witte and Woodbury 1985). Audit rates are significant
for some, but not all audit classes (Dubin and Wilde 1988), and the relationship between
the marginal tax rates and the level of compliance is still a polemic issue in the empirical
studies (Yitzhaki 1974; Clotfelter 1983; Slemrod 1985; Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 1987,
1990). Besides, none of the studies reviewed above addresses the twin issues raised in the
Introduction. Because empirical models without addressing the issues of spatiality and
persistence will be misspecified, the ignorance of the above issues may well render their
results biased and inconsistent and the policy prescription based on any of those studies
will be misleading.

A MODIFIED MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE

Before we make any effort to incorporate the interdependence and the persistence
a caveat is in order. That is, no single theoretical model can address all three different
explanations outlined in the Introduction simultaneously. Therefore, our approach is both
eclectic and demonstrative. Let us start with the original Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki
model of income tax evasion. Consider an individual i whose true income at time t, yit, is
known only to him but not to the tax authority. Tax is levied at constant rate, τit, on the
declared income. However, with some probability pit taxpayer i will be subject to
investigation by the tax authority and if found under reported will be subject to a penalty
rate, θit, on the evaded income, Eit. Note that θit is higher than τit. As discussed earlier,
taxpayer i in evading the amount Eit from the tax authority takes into consideration the
amount successfully evaded in the previous period, Eit-1, by himself as well as the
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amount, Ejt, contemporaneously evaded by another taxpayer, j. Suppose the IRS audit
rule is as follows: whether or not individual taxpayer i will be audited this year depends
on how much that individual evaded last year as well as how much individual j evades
this year.
Thus, individual i’s after-tax income is state dependent and given as

W1 = yit − τ it ( yit − Eit )

if she is not caught cheating, and

(3.1)

W2 = yit − τ it yit − θ itτ it Eit if she is caught cheating

(3.2)

Suppose that the individual maximizes Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Taxpayer, i, will
then choose Eit so as to maximize
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(3.3)

) implies that evasion of income by

individual i at time t is conditional on his evasion in the previous period together with the
contemporaneous evasion by another individual j.
Now if conditioning of pit on Eit-1, Ejt is ignored, the familiar Allingham-SandmoYitzhaki first order condition can be derived as

(1 − pit (.))U it' (W1 ) = pit (.)θ itU it' (W2 )

(3.4)
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where single prime on shows the first partial derivative of Uit with respect to Eit, W1 and
W2 are after-tax-income in the two states of nature as defined above. In this case all of the
basic results of the Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model follow. However, if the
probability of being audited is conditional on Eit-1, Ejt, it greatly complicates the analysis
of the optimal choice of Eit, since both Eit-1, Ejt are now arguments on both sides of the
first order condition (3.4). The influence of Eit-1 or Ejt on Eit can be obtained by totally
differentiating (3.4) treating all other parameters constant for the sake of brevity:

( )
( )) ( )

( )
dp it (.)
( ) ( ) dE jt
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(3.6)

where the double prime on Uit shows the second partial derivatives with respect to Eit.
From the second order condition characterizing the optimal choice of Eit, the first term in
the denominator of the right hand sides of (3.5) and (3.6) must be negative. Also, the first
term in the numerator of the right hand sides of (3.5) and (3.6) must be positive. Hence
the impact of a change in Ejt or Eit-1 on the level of Eit depends on the sign of the second
term in each of the cases. Insofar as the sign of

()

dpit .
dE jt

or

()

dp it .

dE it −1

cannot be determined a

priori, the sign of the impact of either Ejt or Eit-1 or both must be determined empirically.
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The solution of the taxpayer’s utility maximization results in the following general
functional form:

Eit = f (E jt , Eit −1 , X it )

(3.7)

where X it is set of characteristics that influences the evasion behavior of the individual,
and Eit, Eit-1, and Ejt are as defined above. This brings us to the issue of testing dynamic
and/or spatial effects. This is done after we describe the data used in the model and some
methodological issues.

DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The empirical analysis of this essay is based primarily on the state, district, and
regional level data collected from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue as well as the IRS Data Book for 1979-1997. Appendix E presents the list of the

IRS districts and regions. These publications contain state-level information on the
number of individual income tax returns filed, the number of returns examined and the
amounts of additional taxes and penalties recommended by the IRS offices at the district
and regional levels. The IRS also records data on these variables against the service
center(s) of the IRS regions. For data reported against service centers, treatments are

given as follows: the number of returns examined that are recorded against the IRS
service center(s) in a region are prorated among the constituting states in proportion to
the number of returns filed; the amount of additional taxes and penalties recorded against
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the service center(s) in a region are prorated among the constituting states in proportion
to the number of returns examined.
The recent IRS Reform Act reorganized the entire district system and required
many district offices to be responsible for the tax returns filed by multiple states. As a
result, most of the district-level statistics in 1997 included services provided to multiple
states. Since only state-level data are used in the analysis, we take the 1996 allocations of
examinations, additional taxes for each state among all states in the newly defined
districts and extrapolate the annual figures for 1997 based on the 1996 proportions. For
states with multiple districts, the district-level data are aggregated to the state level.
Further, the data on Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), the number of returns with wages and
salaries, with itemized deductions, and the total number of exemptions are obtained from
the Statistics of Income Bulletin of the IRS.
These are augmented by data on ‘retail trade employment’, ‘proprietors’
employment’, ‘service sector employment’, and ‘total employment’ from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. The data on total, non-white, and population over 65 years of age,

and the Gini coefficient were obtained from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States
from the Bureau of the Census. Finally, the unemployment data are obtained from the
Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics. Along with the variables dictated by the tax evasion

model, these additional variables were used in many of the previous studies.
From the IRS data, additional taxes and penalties recommended were divided by
the number of individual income tax returns filed in a state to get a proxy for the
individual income tax evasion (Eit). We, however, know that additional taxes and
penalties recommended differ from the additional taxes and penalties assessed due to
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subsequent bilateral and legal settlement between the IRS and the individual corporation.
But, data on the additional taxes and penalties assessed are not available from the IRS
published documents.
Even though the probability of detection is related to a myriad of factors, audit
rates have traditionally been regarded as the most important. We thus use the number of
individual income tax returns examined divided by the number of individual income tax
returns filed times 100 to get a proxy for individual income tax audit rate. Audit rates
have been the focus of much attention in the tax evasion literature, and the IRS believes
that audits are one of the most effective deterrent tools. It may, however, be noted that the
central focus on audit is changing in the IRS. Since the 1980s the IRS has been
intensifying the use of other deterrence and enforcement tools to supplement the
declining role of audit. Unfortunately, data on these tools by state and year are not
publicly available.
We form four new variables from data available in the Statistics of Income
Bulletin and the IRS Data Book: (i) per return adjusted gross income: adjusted gross

income divided by the number of individual income tax returns filed; (ii) percent of
returns filed with wages and salaries: total number of returns filed with wages and
salaries divided by total number of returns filed; (iii) percent of returns filed with
itemized deductions: total number of returns filed with itemized deductions divided by
total number of returns filed, and (iv) per return exemptions: total number of exemptions
claimed divided by total number of returns filed.
From the BEA employment data, we created three series: (i) percent of
proprietors’ employment: total number of proprietors divided by total number of people
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employed; (ii) percent of retail trade employment: total number of people employed in
retail trade divided by total number of people employed; and (iii) percent of service
sector employment: total number of people employed in the service sector divided by
total number of people employed.
Non-compliance in our model is not independent of the marginal tax rates. In
order to test the relationship between tax rates and the tax evasion of the individual we
need a measure of individual tax rate. We resolve this issue by using the dollar weighted
marginal tax rates available at from the National Bureau of Economic Analysis.2 These
rates are calculated by the NBER TAXSIM model from micro data for a sample of the
U.S. taxpayers. The figures are generated by first calculating the tax liability of each
eligible return, and then increasing all income types by 1 percent and recalculating the tax
liability under the assumption that itemized deductions are constant. The difference in
aggregate tax divided by the difference in aggregate income is the marginal tax rate on
the average dollar of income.
The rates take account of most features of the tax code including the maximum
tax, minimum tax, alternative taxes, partial inclusion of social security, earned income tax
credit, phase outs of the standard deduction and lowest bracket rate, etc. Because state of
residence for taxpayers with AGI>$200,000 is not given in the data, high income
taxpayers are assigned randomly to states in proportion to the number of high income
taxpayers listed in the Statistics of Income annual volumes of the Internal Revenue
Service. Thiss caveat should be borne in mind while interpreting the coefficient of the
variable.
2

See at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/ally/ally.csv for details; Internet, accessed in May, 2006.
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Data on the marital status were also obtained from the NBER.3 Similar to data on
marginal tax rates, these data are also are available by state and by year for returns with
AGI≤ $200,000. Returns with AGI > $200,000 are, therefore, prorated based on the
distribution of income in the state in that particular year. This caveat should be borne in
mind while interpreting the coefficient of the variable.

ECONOMETRIC MODELS

Following our discussion of the possible presence of the spatial effect and
dynamic effect, we posit a general model in which an individual i’s income tax evasion
(Eit) depends on individual j’s income tax evasion behavior, on that individual’s past
income tax evasion, and on a set of local socioeconomic variables:

N

Eit = ρ ∑ ωij E jt + γEit −1 + x ′it β + η i + u it ;

i = 1, …, N; j = 1, …, N;

(5.1)

j ≠i

and t = 1, …, T
N

uit = λ ∑ ωij u jt + ε it ;

i = 1, …, N; j = 1, …, N;

(5.2)

j ≠i

t = 1, …, T

Since we use a cross-section of states over time, subscripts i and t represent an average
individual in the state and time periods, respectively; ρ is a scalar parameter measuring
the slope of the reaction function; ωij are spatial weights used to compute the effect of the
3

The author is grateful to Dr. Daniel Feenberg, NBER, for making data on marital status available.
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individual income tax evasion of states relevant to state i; ωij ≠ 0 if individuals in states i
and j interact strategically, and, by convention, ωii=0; xit is (k×1) is a vector of individual
i’s socioeconomic conditions, γ the coefficient of persistence in evasion, and β is the

corresponding vector of coefficients on the other conditioning variables. The first element
of xit is unity to allow for the intercept. We assume that the parameters ρ, γ and β are
constant across time and space. The spatial and the dynamic analyses are special cases of
the above general model. We will discuss the estimation technique in one type of analysis
assuming that the other effect is absent for the sake of brevity. Further, we omit
discussion of the features of the model when neither spatial effects through the dependent
variable or the error term nor the dynamic effects are present, for it then becomes a
typical panel model whose features and estimation techniques are outlined in any
standard text on panel econometrics. However, it may be noted that even simple fixed or
random effects model will produce biased results in this case since the audit rate is
endogenous.
Estimation of Panel Model with Endogenous Audit Rate
Since the audit is endogenous, we need to find proper instruments to address it.
Some of the past studies used the IRS cost per return as an instrument for this purpose.
However, for us this is a bad instrument in that both the costs per return and the audit rate
are jointly determined. Besides, the cost per return directly affects the level of tax evasion
thus violating the fundamental assumption of being a valid instrument. In order to
substantiate our claim, we checked the validity of the instrument for audit rate. When cost
per return alone is used as an instrument, it makes the audit coefficient statistically
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insignificant; when used with other instruments the test of over-identifying restriction is
rejected. Thus, one needs to look for instruments that have no direct effect on the level of
tax evasion but influence the audit selection. These instruments are the political
affiliation of the President of the United States, the composition of both chambers of the
U.S. Congress, and the party affiliation of the state Governor. The choice of these
instruments is guided by Schulz and Wood (1998), who argue that audit enforcement is
by and large governed by the responsive of the IRS to elected officials. Our assumption is
that the audit rate of individual income tax would be lower if the party affiliation of the
President is Democratic, the Senate and the House each have a Democratic majority and
the state governor is Democratic. This negative association can be expected not because
the Democrats are lenient to tax evaders but because they are proclaimed to be pro
general public as opposed to pro corporation and rich. We checked the validity of
instruments using Sargan (1958) test of over-identifying restrictions and found that our
instruments as valid. This will be detailed while discussing the fixed and random effects
instrumental variable estimates.
Estimation of Spatial Panel Dependence with Spatial Error Correlation
Note that the usual panel model, spatial panel model and dynamic panel model are
all special cases of the above general model. For, instance, let us assume that the dynamic
effect is absent. Then forming vectors of observations in t, the model becomes

E t = ρWt E t + βX t + I Nη + u t ;

t = 1, …, T

(5.3)
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where Et=(E1t,…,ENt)′ is the (N×1) vector of individual income tax evasion for the crosssection of N states at time t, Wt an (N×N) matrix of spatial weights, and Xt is an N×K
matrix with rows given by the set of vectors x′it; η is a (N×1) vector of the unobserved
heterogeneity, and ut is the corresponding (N×1) error term vector.
Under this structure, tax evasion is determined endogenously in equilibrium
because the spatial lag term, WtEt, is correlated with the error term, ut, and ordinary least
squares (OLS) yields inconsistent estimates of the parameters. It is therefore commonly
estimated by using maximum likelihood techniques (Anselin 1988; Anselin and Hudak
1992). Removing the simultaneity in model (5.3), estimation can be carried out with
alternative methods under the assumption that errors are iid. The reduced form equation
is

E t = (I N − ρWt )-1βX t + (I N − ρWt )-1 (I Nη + u t )

; t = 1,…, T

(5.4)

where IN denotes an identity matrix of size N. Equation (5.4) can be estimated by
maximum likelihood method under normality assumptions. Case, Rosen, and Hines
(1993) were, perhaps, the first to use this method in the case of fiscal policy
interdependence.
Even in the absence of spatial autocorrelation (ρ=0), the estimation of model (5.4)
can lead us to conclude erroneously that there is interaction if the error term itself is
subject to spatial autocorrelation, for example, in the form of (5.2) written in matrix form:

u t = λWt u t + ε t ;

t = 1, …, T

(5.5)
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where εt is distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix σ ε2 IN. In this case, spatial
dependence in the error—for example, resulting from similar geographical conditions —
can induce correlation in tax evasion even though individuals may have no interactions.
Uncorrected spatial correlation in the error term would not affect the consistency of the
estimated parameter β, but it would reduce its efficiency. If there is strategic interaction
(ρ≠ 0), ignoring the spatial lag term WtEt in the estimation is more serious, since it yields
inconsistent estimates of β. It is important therefore to test for both kinds of spatial
dependence (in the dependent variable and in the error term).
Maximum likelihood estimation is complicated when we account for spatial
correlation in the error term by possible identification problems (Anselin 1988). We
follow the instrumental variables approach because it avoids this issue, it is
computationally easier to implement, and it does not require distributional assumptions
on the error term ε. W assume that the parameters (β′, ρ)′ and ( σ ε2 , λ) are time-invariant.
This allows us to estimate the model pooling the panel of observations, stacking them
over the time index as:

E = ρWE + βX + I N ⊗ iTη + u ;

t = 1, …, T

(5.6)

with

u = λWu + ε ;

t = 1, …, T

(5.7)
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where E = (E1′,…, ET′)′and ε = (ε1′,…, εT′)′ are (NT ×1) vectors, with T equal to the total
number of periods. X is the (NT ×K) matrix of stacked exogenous variables, and η is a
(NT×1) vector of the unobserved heterogeneity. W is an (NT ×NT) block-diagonal matrix
of spatial weights, with T copies of W along the diagonal, in the case of time-invariant
weights, and with matrices (W1,…, WT) in the case of time-variant weights. IN is an
(N×N) identity matrix and iT is a (T×1) vector of unity. Finally, we assume that the
covariance matrix of ε is given by σ ε2 INT.
When the true model is given by the (5.6) and (5.7), an application of Kelejian
and Prucha’s(1998) generalized two stage least squares (G2SLS) procedures performed
in three steps is outlined as follows. In the first step the (demeaned) regression model in

[

]

(5.6) is estimated by 2SLS procedure using the instruments H ⊂ X , WX , W 2 X that are
linearly independent columns. In the second step the spatial error correlation parameter λ
is estimated in terms of the residuals obtained via the first step and the generalized
moments procedure suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1999). Finally, in the third step,
the original (demeaned) regression model in (5.6) is re-estimated by 2SLS after
transforming it via a Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation to account for the spatial error
correlation.
Estimation of Dynamic Panel Model
Instead if we assume that the spatial dependence and the spatial error effects are
absent, the model involving (5.1) and (5.2) becomes a dynamic panel model. In the
context of a persistent dependent variable and endogenous regressors, neither fixed
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effects nor the random effects nor even the spatial panel estimators outlined above gives
consistent estimates. As argued earlier, one of the right-hand-side variables in (5.1) is
correlated with the random error term. This contention is confirmed by Hausman (1978)
test in the next section. This makes both the fixed effects and the random effects
estimates inconsistent. For this reason, in addition to the usual panel and spatial panel
estimators, we estimate the instrumental variable estimation following Anderson and
Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998) to obtain
consistent estimates of tax evasion equation in the presence of dynamics and endogenous
explanatory variables. Essentially, the approach involves writing the model in (5.1) and
(5.2) without the first terms, and first difference (5.1) to get rid of the individual
heterogeneity as:

E it − E it −1 = α(E it −1 − Eit −2 ) + (x it−1 − x it−2 ) β + (u it − u it −1 )
'

(5.8)

By construction, the differenced lag of the tax evasion equation (Eit −1 − Eit −2 ) in
the above equation is endogenous. Further, as noted earlier, xit contains endogenous
variables, such as the audit rates. Therefore, we need instruments to consistently estimate
the above equation. The differenced right-hand-side variables are instrumented with
appropriately lagged levels. On the assumption that the error term in (5.2) are serially
uncorrelated, i.e., E (uit uis ) = 0 , the following moment condition yield the appropriate
instruments for the differenced lagged dependent variable and the endogenous
explanatory variables.
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E (Eit − s ∆uit ) = 0 for t = 3, …, T and s ≥ 2

(5.9)

E (x it − s ∆uit ) = 0 for t = 3, …, T and s ≥ 2

(5.10)

When the moment conditions (5.9) and (5.10) hold, one can use the lagged levels
variables as instruments for the first differenced variables. However, when the lagged
levels are weakly correlated with subsequent first differences, the Arellano and Bond
(1991) differenced GMM estimator suffers from small sample bias (Blundell and Bond
1998). To deal with the potential problem with the differenced GMM estimates, Arellano
and Bover (1995) proposed an estimator that makes use of additional information in
levels. This relatively new estimator is referred to as the system GMM estimator. This
approach combines two sets of equations—one set in the first differences and another in
levels—into a system of equations. This introduces additional T-2 moment restrictions
given by:

E [(η i + uit )∆Eit −1 ] = 0

(5.11)

E [(η i + uit )∆x it −1 ] = 0

(5.12)

The system GMM estimator uses the moment conditions in equations (5.9)
through (5.12) to consistently estimate the parameters of interest in equation (5.1) under
the assumption made at the beginning of this sub-section.
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It should be noted that valid instruments should be correlated with the included
endogenous explanatory variable(s) and, at the same time, orthogonal to the error term.
To ensure the validity of the instruments, we conduct the Sargan (1958) test of over
identifying restrictions to jointly test the appropriateness of the instruments.4 The null for
the test is that the instruments are valid in that they are not correlated with the errors.
Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as χ (2L−k ) , where L is the number of
instruments and k is the number of parameters in the model.
Further, as noted earlier, the consistency of the GMM estimation depends on
whether errors in the levels equation are white noise. If the errors are serially correlated
the GMM will lose its consistency. We thus, test for the second order autocorrelation in
the differenced equation. The test statistic developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is
detailed in their appendix along with its distributional characteristics. By construction, we
expect first order serial correlation in first differenced equation but not second or higher
order autocorrelation.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This section covers the empirical results obtained from estimating the various
models developed in the previous section. After the descriptive statistics of the data, we
start off with the most restricted estimates—the simple panel IV estimates—as the
benchmark. We then relax the assumption of spatiality and persistence in sequence to see
what happens to the estimates. We find that the simple estimates are biased since these
estimates ignore the twin issues of spatiality and persistence. Along the same line of
4

Also see Hansen (1982) for details.
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argument, the spatial and dynamic panel estimates in isolation are also biased since either
of the estimates ignores the other effects. This bias of the dynamic panel estimate is
confirmed when we checked the Moran I and LM statistics of the error term.

Descriptive Statistics

The definition and the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study are
presented in Table 1. The average real per return evasion of individual income taxes is
about $4 thousand over the sample period. The mean individual income tax audit rate is
1.4 percent. The average marginal income tax rate (state and federal combined) is 30
percent. However, it varies between 22 and 43 percent across states and years. The mean
real adjusted gross income is about $30 thousand. About 85 percent of the returns are
filed by earners of wages and salaries which contain information of income and tax
withheld by the third-party, the employers.
About one-third of the returns filed present itemized deductions and more than
two exemptions for dependants are claimed. However, there are wide variations in both
filing with itemized deductions and claimants of dependants across years and states.
Around half of the returns are filed jointly by married couples.
The IRS spends around $28 for running the administration of which enforcement
is a major component. Of the total per return costs, it incurs $22 as compensation to the
personnel at the national office and the field staff in the IRS districts and regions. Of the
rest, a sizeable amount is spent for legal pursuit of the cases against the evaders. It is
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puzzling why the IRS does not expand its audit coverage when one compares the costs
and returns of the tax base enforcement.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used: 1979-97
Variables
Mean
Std.
Min
Max
Per Return Evasion ($)
3774.152 1905.116 1045.989 20858.460
Audit Rate (%)
1.418
0.633
0.407
4.827
State & Federal Combined Tax Rate (%)
29.897
3.323
22.440
42.910
Real AGI ($ 000)
29.532
4.068
20.150
49.737
Returns with Wages & Salaries (%)
85.296
3.673
61.017
94.131
Returns with Itemized Deduction (%)
30.580
7.294
13.432
50.292
Per Return Exemption (no.)
2.285
0.188
1.505
2.953
Joint Returns (%)
46.237
5.554
26.980
65.220
Proprietors in Total Employment (%)
16.786
3.688
9.314
27.179
Retail Trade in Total Employment (%)
16.524
1.164
11.646
19.777
Services in Total Employment (%)
25.472
4.735
15.804
43.670
Elderly Population (%)
12.370
2.414
2.740
21.186
Non-white Population (%)
18.738
13.594
0.683
71.441
Gini Coefficient
0.377
0.026
0.330
0.446
Unemployment Rate (%)
6.425
2.129
2.225
18.017
Party Affiliation of President*
0.368
0.483
0.000
1.000
Senate Democrat Ratio
51.632
4.936
45.000
58.000
House Democrat Ratio
57.871
5.112
46.897
63.678
Party Affiliation of State Governor*
0.566
0.492
0.000
1.000
Real Personnel Costs Per Return ($)
21.90
5.76
12.76
47.89
Real Capital Costs per Return ($)
0.75
0.60
0.08
6.23
Real Other Costs Per Return ($)
6.31
2.13
1.72
19.20
Note: *Party affiliation of the President = 1 if he is Democrat and 0 otherwise. Party
affiliation of the State Governor is similarly defined.
It must be remembered that compliances by the individuals are influenced by
many other factors not included in the above list. Appendix F gives correlation matrix
between the variables involved. There is no high correlation between the explanatory
variables and their partial correlation with dependent variable implies that the variables
explain part of the variation in the income tax evasion.
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There is no definite time trend in the data except per return evasion and the audit
rate. While per return shows an upward trend, the audit rate shows the downward trend.
The mean per return evasion was less than $3000 between 1979 and 1985 but jumped to
around $4000 after 1986 and stayed around at that level. Apparently this is a
contradictory finding in that the TRA was introduced in 1986 and was in effect during
this period.
In contrast, the audit rate was around 1.7 percent between 1979 and 1885. But it
dropped to barely above 1 percent after the TRA was introduced. When plummeting audit
rate is juxtaposed with soaring tax evasion, it resolves the apparent ineffectiveness of the
TRA. That is, the IRS was not given enough resources to bring the evaders to book. The
resource constraint for tax base enforcement was equally a common phenomenon when
the Republican and the Democratic presidents held power.
Estimation Results
Table 2 reports the results of the simple fixed and random effects models with
treatment given to the endogeneity of audit rate as discussed before but ignoring both the
persistence and the spatial effects. Even though these are intermediate results, we will
make some passing remarks and compare them to the findings of the previous studies
along this line. Note that these fixed effects results assume that all effects are in long-run
equilibrium. However, even if we ignore the spatial effects discussed later, taxpayers are
assumed to change their behavior and modify their reported taxes due based on their past
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experience. We conducted test for individual heterogeneity by performing an F-test.5 The
null is that there is no individual heterogeneity. The test statistic reported at the bottom of
Table 2 rejects the null at 1 percent significant level implying evidence of individual
effects in the data. We also conducted the Hausman (1978) test in order to decide which
set of results are valid. The estimated test statistic reported at the bottom of Table 2
implies the explanatory variables are correlated with the individual heterogeneity and
hence the fixed effects estimation is the appropriate procedure.
Note that most of the explanatory variables included in model affect the tax
evasion at the 10 percent level with expected signs. Based on these results one arrives at
conclusions similar to Jou (1992) but not Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde ((1990) because these
latter authors used different dependent variables in their analyses. However, these results
albeit corrected for endogeneity of the audit rate are still biased because both the dynamic
and spatial effects discussed earlier are ignored.
Since we have only one endogenous variable and we used three instruments for it,
the model is over-identified. We thus conducted the test of over-identifying restrictions
following Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) that are used in IV estimation. The test
statistic reported at the bottom of Table 2 shows that the instruments are valid. However,
the strength of these instruments should be judged in the light of conditions outlined in
Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995). The main condition is that use of weak instruments can
lead to inconsistent IV estimates. Further, these biases are in the same direction as the
OLS estimates in finite samples.

5

This test procedure is detailed in Baltagi (2001).
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Table 2. Fixed and Random Effects IV Estimates
Variables
Audit Rate

FE Estimates
RE Estimates
-1,692.694***
-1,487.922***
(359.013)
(398.446)
State & Federal Combined Marginal Tax Rate
-118.311***
-105.664**
(40.264)
(42.572)
Adjusted Gross Income
28.414
79.381***
(33.419)
(27.596)
Percent of Returns with Wages and Salaries
-19.313
-86.811***
(40.846)
(33.589)
Percent of Returns with Itemized Deduction
59.787***
47.932**
(19.936)
(19.161)
Number of Exemptions per Return
2,516.503***
2,584.621***
(936.129)
(744.535)
Percent of Joint Returns Filed
6.103
-10.448
(21.854)
(19.603)
Percent of Proprietors in Total Employment
3.226
21.012
(74.968)
(42.873)
Percent of Retail Trade in Total Employment
92.051
-36.763
(120.289)
(87.968)
Percent of Service Sector in Total Employment
219.119***
147.435***
(54.112)
(30.570)
Percent of Elderly Population
-237.947***
-186.450***
(89.122)
(61.228)
Percent of Non-white Population
41.041**
26.014***
(16.832)
(9.463)
Gini Coefficient
-12,427.455**
-4,893.577
(5,081.210)
(4,433.670)
Unemployment Rate
-90.748**
-33.285
(42.234)
(36.187)
Constant
2,944.570
7,591.937**
(4,498.785)
(3,517.772)
Observations
950
950
Individual Effects [F(49,886)]
6.81***[0.000]
8.711**[0.0334]
Sargan-Hansen Test [χ2(3)]
41.84*** [0.0001]
Hausman Test [χ2(14)]
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk implies significant at 10 percent; two
asterisks imply significant at 5 percent; and three asterisks imply significant at 1 percent.
Figures in the brackets are p-values.
The fixed effects IV estimator is less efficient if the audit rate is in fact not
endogenous. Therefore, it is useful to test for endogeneity of the audit rate to see whether
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the IV estimation method is at all necessary. In order to do this, we do our panel
regression analysis in two stages: in the first stage, we regress the audit rate on the party
affiliation of the U.S. President, the ratio of Democrats to the Republicans in both the
chambers of the U.S. Congress, and the party affiliation of the State Governors, and all
other exogenous variables in the original model. We then substitute the predicted value of
the audit rate for the actual audit rate and estimate the model by panel estimation method.
Table 3. Reduced Form of Audit Rate
Variables
Dependent Variable: Audit Rate
Party Affiliation of President
-0.104** (0.047)
Senate Democratic Ratio
0.023*** (0.007)
House Democratic Ratio
-0.055*** (0.007)
Party of Affiliation State Governor
-0.003 (0.031)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk implies significant at 10 percent; two
asterisks imply significant at 5 percent; and three asterisks imply significant at 1 percent.
We do not report all other coefficients except those associated with the instruments.
Table 4. Test of Endogeneity of Audit Rate
Variables
Dependent Variable: Evasion
Audit Rate
-1,692.694*** (354.153)
Residual of Audit Rate
611.027* (374.269)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk implies significant at 10 percent; two
asterisks imply significant at 5 percent; and three asterisks imply significant at 1 percent.
We do not report all other coefficients except those associated with the actual audit rate
and the residual from the first stage regression.
The results of the first stage regression are summarized in Table 3. Audit
enforcement becomes lax with a Democratic President and majority Democrats in the
House in power. This may imply that the Democrats try to serve the interest of the
common people as opposed to the Republicans who are alleged to serve corporate
interests. If this claim is valid then sign of coefficient of the ratio of Democrats in the
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Senate is “wrong.” Finally, as expected, state Governors have little influence over the
federal audit strategy in their states. We do not discuss this equation as it is a reduced
form equation as opposed to structural form of the audit equation.
Finally, the test in Table 4 supports the hypothesis that audit rate is endogenously
determined. This is because the estimate for residual of the audit rate from the first stage
regression is different from zero at the 10 percent significance level. However, the
marginal significance cast doubt about the strength of these instruments and reminds us
of the observations made by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995).
Estimation of the tax evasion model specified in (5.6) and (5.7) requires
specification of proximity of states. According to the theory outlined in the earlier section
individual i’s tax evasion behavior is dependent on j’s behavior. Given the per capita
state data on evasion some metric of proximity must be used. However, the weight matrix
must be exogenous to the regressors. Anselin (2002) pointed out that construction of the
distance metric based on any of the regressors makes the model highly non-linear with
endogeneity problem that must be instrumented out. As a result of this constraint, use of
weight matrix based on income or population is ruled out. At the same time the weight
must be meaningful enough to represent dependence in the dependent variable or the
error term.
In view of these we selected three alternative metrics: (i) neighbors belong to the
same Division in the U.S. Bureau of Census, (ii) neighbors belong to the same Region in
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and (iii) neighbors belong to the same Region in
Internal Revenue Service. Note that clustering of states based on the above are not ad
hoc; rather they are based on the co-movement of several socioeconomic factors. As such
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these matrices contain both time variant information such as per capita income
differential and time invariant such as their geographic proximity.
As indicated earlier, the efficiency and properties of estimators as well as the
properties of other statistics will in general depend upon whether or not a model’s
disturbance terms are indeed spatially correlated and whether the models have spatially
lagged dependent variable. As a result, it is important to estimate spatial correlation both
in the dependent variable as well as the error term and check if there are strategic
dependence both in the dependent and the error term. Any evidence in either of these
evidence will render the panel estimates discussed earlier biased and/or inconsistent.
Table 5 reports the results of the general spatial model. It, however, still ignores
the dynamic persistence. Note that the spatial lag coefficient is not precise when weight
matrix is defined following BEA Regions or Census Divisions; it is only marginally
significant when the weight matrix following the IRS regions. The last results indicate
that there is strategic interaction among neighboring states in the determination of
individual income tax evasion. Furthermore, this interaction suggests a positively sloped
reaction function in tax evasion, as expected. In terms of elasticity, a unit less measure, a
10 percent increase in the individual income tax evasion in the neighboring states results
in an increase of 3.3 percent in a state’s individual income tax evasion. It may be noted
that the coefficient of the spatial error switches sign when the spatial weight is based on
the IRS divisions. Most of the explanatory variables are statistically significant. Since the
estimate of spatial error correlation is significant, it is evident that there are substantial
spatial error effects.
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Table 5. General (Kelejian–Prucha) Spatial Estimates
Variables

Weight Matrix
BEA Regions Census Divisions IRS Regions
0.052
0.111
0.333***
Spatial Dependence (λ)
(0.124)
(0.102)
(0.125)
Audit Rate
-1333.700***
-1536.540***
-1017.580***
(277.869)
(295.184)
(253.037)
State & Federal Combined
-61.031**
-46.316
-85.478***
Marginal Tax Rate
(29.621)
(30.772)
(27.550)
Adjusted Gross Income
133.242***
135.441***
122.209***
(21.035)
(21.230)
(20.496)
Percent of Returns with
-141.376***
-133.916***
-146.127***
Wages and Salaries
(23.082)
(23.539)
(22.572)
Percent of Returns with
14.786
7.675
22.437*
Itemized Deduction
(14.055)
(14.522)
(13.475)
Number of Exemptions per Return 3105.910***
3168.220***
2896.470***
(560.109)
(564.977)
(542.387)
Percent of Joint Returns Filed
-35.175**
-34.882**
-36.255**
(16.773)
(16.893)
(16.342)
Percent of Proprietors
28.865
38.752
12.280
In Total Employment
(29.133)
(29.761)
(27.822)
Percent of Retail Trades
-105.693*
-122.069**
-78.602
In Total Employment
(60.517)
(61.265)
(58.775)
Percent of Service Sector
122.904***
132.239***
101.762***
In Total Employment
(21.488)
(22.087)
(19.818)
Percent of Elderly Population
-181.809***
-197.601***
-142.734***
(39.991)
(41.305)
(37.569)
Percent of Non-white Population
12.486**
13.160**
9.594*
(6.042)
(6.111)
(5.860)
Gini Coefficient
3226.750
2781.480
4543.490
(3390.990)
(3423.020)
(3262.750)
Unemployment Rate
57.165*
66.212**
49.506*
(30.809)
(31.376)
(30.038)
Constant
8057.850***
7202.390**
7799.750***
(2863.510)
(2914.450)
(2772.660)
0.087***
0.073***
-0.009***
Spatial Error (ρ )
(0.001)
(0.020)
(0.001)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk implies significant at 10 percent; two
asterisks imply significant at 5 percent; and three asterisks imply significant at 1 percent.
Since we have identified that there is strategic interaction (mainly through the
error), the effects of the exogenous variables will have an impact on the entire
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configuration of equilibrium level of individual income tax evasion. This is true even if
they take place in only one of the interacting states; through their repercussions on the
state’s tax evasion they may exert significant influence on the tax evasion behavior of the
other states. As will be detailed out later, the so-called Moran I and LM statistics
vindicate our claim. It may, however, be noted that the spatial estimation results, albeit
elegant, are both biased and inconsistent as the estimation ignores the persistence in tax
evasion.
The results of Arellano-Bond Dynamic GMM estimation are presented in Table 6.
These results are nice and elegant with most of the coefficients vary in the expected way.
However, the estimates show the combined effects of direct and spatial influences.
However, if we look at the spatial diagnostic tests, which indicate serious spatial
correlations, it is evident the results are potentially misleading due to model
misspecification. To that end, we conducted spatial diagnostic tests detailed in Appendix
G. The results of Moran I and the LM statistics presented in Table 7 imply that there are
indeed spatial effects no matter what form of the contiguity weight matrix is used. Thus
the results of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimates should be interpreted with caution.
In order to check the validity of the instruments used in the Arellano-Bond GMM
estimates we conducted the test of over-identifying restrictions. The Hansen (1982)
statistic implies that the lagged values used as instruments satisfy the moment conditions
discussed before. The Arellano-Bond estimators introduce first order serial correlation in
the data, but if there are higher order serial correlations in the data then use of this
estimator is inappropriate.
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Table 6. Arellano-Bond GMM Dynamic Panel Estimates
Variables
Lagged Per Return Evasion
Audit Rate
State & Federal Combined Marginal Tax Rate
Adjusted Gross Income
Percent of Returns with Wages and Salaries
Percent of Returns with Itemized Deduction
Number of Exemptions per Return
Percent of Joint Returns Filed
Percent of Proprietors in Total Employment
Percent of Retail Trade in Total Employment
Percent of Service Sector in Total Employment
Percent of Elderly Population
Percent of Non-white Population
Gini Coefficient
Unemployment Rate
Constant
Observations
Hansen Test[χ2(34)]
AR(1)
AR(2)

Coefficient Estimates
0.400***
(0.023)
-1,215.226***
(136.653)
-47.026**
(18.282)
147.171***
(29.990)
-103.292***
(24.733)
74.758***
(11.192)
2,963.688***
(638.264)
-28.945
(31.068)
116.383**
(48.130)
101.651
(178.937)
67.320**
(28.987)
-99.903**
(48.214)
6.035
(10.390)
10,183.174***
(2,339.135)
170.505***
(39.437)
-7,149.161***
(2,527.553)
900
37.00 [0.332]
-3.36 [0.001]
-0.89 [0.375]

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk implies significant at 10 percent; two
asterisks imply significant at 5 percent; and three asterisks imply significant at 1 percent.
Figures in the brackets are p-values.
Table 7. Spatial Diagnostics of Errors
Weight Matrix
Moran I Statistic
LM Statistic
BEA Regions
0.049***(2.630)
5.944[0.015]
Census Divisions
0.078***(3.785)
12.894[0.000]
IRS Regions
0.060***(4.871)
19.829[0.000]
Note: Figures in the parentheses are z- statistics, those in the brackets are p-values
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We also test for first and second order serial correlation following Arellano and
Bond (1991). The results reported in Table 6 show evidence of first order serial
correlation but absence of any higher order serial correlation.
We find that audit rate constrains the level of evasion irrespective of the type of
weight matrix used. These results are similar to previous findings based on cross-section
and time-series data (Tauchen, Witte, and Beron 1989; Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 1990).
Our results suggest that raising the audit rate by one percentage point would have
decreased the level of evasion by more than one third of a percent from the mean level.
This is equal to a reduction of more than $1200 of evasion in the short run. Given the
estimated persistence of around one quarter, the reduction is more than $2000 per
individual return. These results offer strong support for the deterrence effect of audit. Our
results also suggest that the decline in the audit rate over the last three decades may be
partly responsible for the decline in voluntary tax compliance.
One of the novelties of our results is the use of combined actual average marginal
tax rates for the federal and state governments. Most of the past studies had to use the
average state tax rate for this purpose. Contrary to the popular orthodoxy, our results
suggest that evasion decreases as the marginal tax rate increases, a result reminiscent of
Yitzhaki (1974) who argued that if penalty is proportional to the taxes evaded, then an
increase in the marginal tax would unambiguously decrease the level of evasion if there is
decreasing absolute risk aversion of income. Our results suggest that an increase in the
marginal tax rate by 10 percentage points would decrease the level of evasion by 0.2
percentage point in the short run. Given the level of persistence this implies that a 10
percent increase in the audit rate would decrease evasion by about one third of a percent
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from the mean level. This also dispels the misconception that the federal income tax rate
in the U.S. has reached the maximum of the so-called “Laffer Curve.”
The coefficient of adjusted gross income (AGI) is positive and significant. These
results are consistent with the hypothesis of increasing absolute risk aversion, commonly
accepted as a reasonable assumption in models of individual choice under uncertainty.
Our results suggest that a one percent increase in the AGI would lead to more than one
percent increase in evasion in the short run and more two percent in the long run.
The percent of returns filed with wages and salaries was associated – as expected
– with better compliance. Clotfelter (1983) cited two possible factors for such a strong
positive relationship. First, as wages and salaries are held by a third party and report to
the IRS, the taxpayers may well be convinced that detection of evasion is more likely
with these types of income. In addition, these incomes are relatively simple to report in
the tax form. Our results suggest that a one percent increase in the returns filed with
wages and salaries would be associated with more than two percent decline in the level of
evasion in the short run and about four percent in the long run. In contrast itemized
deductions and the number of exemptions claimed are not subject to any verification
unless the return is audited. As such these variables were found to be positively
associated with the level of evasion. While a one percent increase in the returns with
itemized deductions increases evasion by about $74, successful claim of an additional
exemption per return increases evasion by about $3000.
There are tendency for the married couple to evade less than the other groups but
the coefficient estimates is imprecise. These results corroborates finding of some of the
previous studies (Tauchen, Witte, and Beron 1989) but at variance with others (Kamdar
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1995). However, in the absence of any solid theoretical foundations, the above results
should be interpreted with caution. Moreover, the parameter estimates are also imprecise.
Hence any policy prescription based on these estimate would be fraught with danger.
Several past studies and anecdotal observations point to certain groups for tax
noncompliance. Some of these include income from sole proprietorship, retail trade, and
service sector employments. To examine these propositions, we used the percent share of
proprietors, retail trade, and service sector employment to total employment, with an
expected positive relationship between evasion and each of them. The results corroborate
our claims in that we found strong positive relationship between evasion and percent
share of proprietorship and service sector and imprecise but positive with the retail trade.
The elderly population appears to have tendency to evade less than their younger
counterparts. Dubin, Graetz, and Wild (1990) found similar relationship in their
estimation. One explanation for this relationship could be that most of the elderly live at
the subsistence income level and hence do not have any supernumerary income to hide
from the tax authorities or even a fewer of them exceed the threshold income level to file
a tax return.
Contrary to popular myth, the percent of population that is nonwhite is not
significantly related to evasion although there is an imprecise but positive relationship
between their fraction in the population and the level of evasion. Since most of the
nonwhite population are at lower income stratum and the evasion is used in this essay is
an average measurement, this may mask the true relationship, because Tauchen, Witte,
and Beron (1989) find a positive relationship between the nonwhite population and the
level of evasion for the low income audit classes.
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It is usually postulated that social norms break down in societies with high
income inequality. Since tax payments is strongly shaped by social norms (Alm,
McClelland, and Schulze 1999) we expected a positive relationship between the level of
tax evasion and the extent of income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. Our
results corroborate the above proposition.
The positive relationship between the rate of unemployment and the level of
evasion suggests that evasion becomes higher during economic recession. These findings
are similar to most of the previous studies (Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 1990; Jou 1992).
One of the reasons for this relationship could be that unemployed people work in the
underground economy for cash payments and do not report their income. Our results
suggest that a three percent reduction in unemployment rate would lead to about one
percent decline in the level of evasion in the short run and more than one percent in the
long run.
Following Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990), we also make an experiment about
the intertemporal effects of declining audit rate. Based on the estimates based on the
unfiltered and filtered data reported in Table 6, we calculated the predicted values of the
level of evasion that would have declined had the audit rate remained at the 1981 level.
By 1996 we estimate that maintaining the audit rate at the 1981 level would have reduced
total evasion by $48.5 billion. As noted above the estimates based on these estimates are
contaminated due to the ignorance of spatial effects. In view of the positive spatial effects
both through the dependent variable and the error term this amount is certain to rise.
However, in the absence of any estimates that deals with both the issues simultaneously
the precise magnitude cannot be measured.
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CONCLUSIONS

The identification of persistence and strategic interaction in models of individual
income tax evasion has important implications for the equilibrium configuration of tax
evasion. In this essay we attempted to modify the basic Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki
model of individual income tax evasion and tested it with state level data of individual
income tax evasion. We found evidence of both persistence and strategic interaction
among individuals in the cluster of states in the determination of tax evasion behavior.
Interaction among states that belongs to a particular group or region based on the BEA,
Census or the IRS criteria, appeared to results in dependence, weakly through the level of
evasion but strongly through common but unidentified shocks.
We initiated an important econometric problem: how to account for spatial effects
in the dynamic panel data model. Since individuals interact and their tax evasion and
influence and are influenced by others either directly or through some common
unobservable shocks, one expects spatial dependence either directly or indirectly. In
addition individuals learn by doing. As no unified approach exists to address this twin
issue, we left the two loose ends untied.
Our results are encouraging, however, because once the presence of persistence
and strategic interactions is identified, the natural extension is to try to account for
specific models of tax evasion to analyze the normative implications of tax evasion
behavior we discussed in the Introduction.
In our analysis we only used weight matrices that are time invariant for obvious
reason of filtering limitation. It is well established that the results of spatial analysis are
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very sensitive to the choice of the weight matrix. Thus, in order to check the robustness
of our results one needs to use a variety of weight matrices such as the so-called
Mahalanobis distance etc.
Further, we did not model explicitly the source of strategic interaction between
individuals. This is a limitation of the analysis in the sense that the source of interaction
is not identified. Also, the empirical analysis is based on the U.S. data. It would be
interesting to see if this conclusions hold for other developed and developing countries.
It would have been ideal to estimate the spatial and the dynamic effects
simultaneously. However, such an estimation method is not available at the moment.
Hence, it would be interesting to devise an estimator that can tackle these issues and
check its robustness using Monte Carlo experiment.
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APPENDIX A: THE PRIMAL PROBLEM OF THE CONSUMER

Given the preference function of the taxpayer defined in (3.15) the Lagrangian is:

4

4

j =1

j =1

[

Max ℑ = ∑ S jU j (x j ,1 − l ) − ∑ λ j y j − p x j

]

(A.1)

The first order conditions for interior solutions can be written as:

∂ℑ
= S jU ij′ x ij ,1 − l − λ j p j = 0 ; i = 1, 2,…, n, j = 1, 2, …, 4
∂xij

(

)

(A.2 – A.5)

4
4
∂ℑ
= − ∑ S jU l′j x ij ,1 − l + ∑ λ j w j = 0
∂l
j =1
j =1

(

)

(A.6)

∂ℑ
= (λ1 + λ2 )[t A (θ A − 1) + k ′A (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B )] + (λ3 + λ4 )[− t A + k ′A (1 − δ A − δ B )] = 0 (A.7)
∂δ A

∂ℑ
= (λ1 + λ3 )[t B (θ B − 1) + k B′ (1 − δ A − δ B + δ Aδ B )] + (λ2 + λ4 )[− t B + k B′ (1 − δ A − δ B )] = 0 (A.8)
∂δ B

∂ℑ
= 0 ; j = 1, 2, …, 4.
∂λ j
4

(

(A.9 – A.12)

)

where − ∑ S jU l′j x ij ,1 − l is the ‘weighted’ average of marginal utilities of leisure
j =1

and λ j are the usual Lagrange multipliers.
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APPENDIX B: THE DUAL PROBLEM OF THE CONSUMER

Given the dual problem of the taxpayer defined in (3.39) the Lagrangian and the
first order conditions for an interior solution are:

4
⎡
⎤
Γ = p x j − lS j w j + ν ⎢V * − ∑ S jU j x j ,1 − l ⎥
⎢⎣
⎥⎦
j =1

(

)

4
∂Γ
= pi − ν ∑ S jU ij′ x ij ,1 − l = 0 ; i = 1, 2,…, n, j = 1, 2, …, 4
∂xij
j =1

(

)

(B.1)

(B.2 – B.5)

4
4
∂Γ
= − ∑ S j w j + ν ∑ S jU l′j (x ij ,1 − l ) = 0
∂l
j =1
j =1

(B.6)

∂Γ
= k ′A − t A [1 − (S1 + S 2 )θ A ] = 0
∂δ A

(B.7)

∂Γ
= k B′ − t B [1 − (S1 + S 3 )θ B ] = 0
∂δ B

(B.8)

4
∂Γ
= V * − ∑ S jU j x j ,1 − l = 0
∂ν
j =1

(B.9)

(

)

whereν is the usual Lagrange multiplier.
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APPENDIX C: SOME COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS

The following relations are derived by differentiating the identities (3.40) – (3.43)
with respect to pk, tA, tB, θA, θB, σk and assuming that both leisure and at least one of the
goods are normal.

⎛ 4
⎜ λ j x kj
∂xij ⎜ ∑
∂xij
j =1
=−
4
⎜
∂α
∂p k
⎜⎜ ∑ λ j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟
c
⎟ ∂xij >
⎟ + ∂p < 0
k
⎟⎟
⎠

(C.1)

⎛ 4
⎜ ∑ λ j x kj
∂l
∂l ⎜ j =1
=−
∂p k
∂α ⎜ 4
⎜⎜ ∑ λ j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟
c
⎟ ∂l >
+
⎟ ∂p < 0
k
⎟⎟
⎠

(C.2)

⎛ 4
⎜ ∑ λ j x kj
∂δ A ⎜ j =1
∂δ A
=−
∂α ⎜ 4
∂p k
⎜⎜ ∑ λ j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟
⎟>
⎟<0
⎟⎟
⎠

(C.3)

⎛ 4
⎜ ∑ λ j x kj
∂δ B ⎜ j =1
∂δ B
=−
∂α ⎜ 4
∂p k
⎜⎜ ∑ λ j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟
⎟>
⎟<0
⎟⎟
⎠

(C.4)

⎞
⎟ ∂x c >
⎟ + ij 0
⎟ ∂t A <
⎟
⎠

(C.5)

⎛
∂xij ⎜ wlλt A
⎜
=−
∂α ⎜ ∑4 λ
∂t A
⎜
j
⎝ j =1

∂xij

∂l
∂l
=−
∂t A
∂α

⎛
⎜ w lλ
⎜ 4 tA
⎜ ∑λ
⎜
j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟ ∂l c >
⎟+
0
⎟ ∂t A <
⎟
⎠

(C.6)

107

⎛
∂δ A
∂δ A ⎜ wlλt A
⎜
=−
∂t A
∂α ⎜ ∑4 λ
⎜
j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟ ∂δ c >
⎟+ A 0
⎟ ∂t A <
⎟
⎠

(C.7)

⎛
∂δ B
∂δ B ⎜ wlλt A
⎜
=−
∂t A
∂α ⎜ ∑4 λ
⎜
j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟ ∂δ c >
⎟+ B 0
⎟ ∂t A <
⎟
⎠

(C.8)

⎛
∂xij ⎜ wlλt B
⎜
=−
∂t B
∂α ⎜ ∑4 λ
⎜
j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟ ∂x c >
⎟ + ij 0
⎟ ∂t B <
⎟
⎠

∂xij

∂l
∂l
=−
∂t B
∂α

⎛
⎜ w lλ
⎜ 4 tB
⎜ ∑λ
⎜
j
⎝ j =1

(C.9)

⎞
⎟ ∂l c >
⎟+
0
⎟ ∂t B <
⎟
⎠

(C.10)

⎛
⎜ wl λ
⎜ 4 tB
⎜ ∑λ
⎜
j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟ ∂δ c >
⎟+ A 0
⎟ ∂t B <
⎟
⎠

(C.11)

⎛
∂δ B
∂δ B ⎜ wlλt B
⎜
=−
∂t B
∂α ⎜ ∑4 λ
⎜
j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟ ∂δ c >
⎟+ B 0
⎟ ∂t B <
⎟
⎠

(C.12)

∂δ A
∂δ
=− A
∂t B
∂α

∂xij
∂σ m

⎛ 4 ∂S j
⎜∑
U j x j (.),1 − l(.)
∂xij ⎜ j =1 ∂σ m
=
4
∂α ⎜
⎜
∑λ j
⎜
j =1
⎝

)⎞⎟

(

⎛ 4 ∂S j
⎜∑
U j x j (.),1 − l(.)
∂l
∂l ⎜ j =1 ∂σ m
=
4
∂σ m ∂α ⎜
⎜
∑λ j
⎜
j =1
⎝

(

c
⎟ ∂xij >
+
⎟ ∂σ < 0
m
⎟
⎟
⎠

m = A, B

(C.13)

m = A, B

(C.14)

)⎞⎟

⎟ ∂l c >
⎟ + ∂σ < 0
m
⎟
⎟
⎠
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∂δ A
∂σ m

⎛ 4 ∂S j
⎜∑
U j x j (.),1 − l(.)
∂δ A ⎜ j =1 ∂σ m
=
4
∂α ⎜
⎜
∑λ j
⎜
j =1
⎝

⎟ ∂δ Ac >
⎟ + ∂σ < 0
m
⎟
⎟
⎠

∂δ B
∂σ m

⎛ 4 ∂S j
⎜∑
U j x j (.),1 − l(.)
∂δ B ⎜ j =1 ∂σ m
=
4
∂α ⎜
⎜
∑λ j
⎜
j =1
⎝

⎟ ∂δ Bc >
⎟ + ∂σ < 0
m
⎟
⎟
⎠

(

(

)⎞⎟

m = A, B

(C.15)

m = A, B

(C.16)

)⎞⎟

109

APPENDIX D: SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION OF THE ‘SUPER
GOVERNMENT’

Let W be the Lagrangian function related to the optimization problem of the
‘super government’ defined in (4.5) – (4.7). One can then derive the following first order
conditions for the ‘super government’ as:

h
∂R (.)
∂R (.) ⎤
∂V (.)
∂W w ⎡
= ∫ ⎢ H ′(.)
+ γ A A + γ B B ⎥dFw = 0
∂t A ⎦
∂t A wl ⎣
∂t A
∂t A

(D.1)

h
∂R (.)
∂R (.) ⎤
∂W w ⎡
∂V (.)
= ∫ ⎢ H ′(.)
+ γ A A + γ B B ⎥dFw = 0
l
∂t B ⎦
∂t B w ⎣
∂t B
∂t B

(D.2)

h
∂R (.)
∂R (.)⎤
∂V (.)
∂W w ⎡
= ∫ ⎢ H ′(.)
+ γ A A + γ B B ⎥dFw = 0
∂α A ⎦
∂α A wl ⎣
∂α A
∂α A

(D.3)

h
∂R (.)
∂R (.) ⎤
∂V (.)
∂W w ⎡
= ∫ ⎢ H ′(.)
+ γ A A + γ B B ⎥dFw = 0
∂α B ⎦
∂α B wl ⎣
∂α B
∂α B

(D.4)

h
∂R (.)
∂R (.) ⎤
∂c (.)
∂c (.)
∂W w ⎡
∂V (.)
= ∫ ⎢ H ′(.)
+ γ A A + γ B B ⎥dFw − γ A A − γ B B = 0
∂σ A wl ⎣
∂σ A
∂σ A
∂σ A ⎦
∂σ A
∂σ A

(D.5)

h
∂R (.)
∂R (.) ⎤
∂c (.)
∂c (.)
∂W w ⎡
∂V (.)
= ∫ ⎢ H ′(.)
+ γ A A + γ B B ⎥dFw − γ A A − γ B B = 0
∂σ B wl ⎣
∂σ B
∂σ B
∂σ B ⎦
∂σ B
∂σ B

(D.6)

h
∂R (.)
∂R (.) ⎤
∂W w ⎡
∂V (.) ∂p k
= ∫ ⎢ H ′(.)
+ γ A A + γ B B ⎥dFw = 0
∂t k wl ⎣
∂p k ∂t k
∂t k
∂t k ⎦

(D.7)

h
∂R (.)
∂R (.) ⎤
∂W w ⎡
∂V (.) ∂p k
∂c(.)
= ∫ ⎢ H ′(.)
+ γ A A + γ B B ⎥dFw − γ B
=0
∂σ k wl ⎣
∂p k ∂σ k
∂σ k
∂σ k ⎦
∂σ k

(D.8)

∂W
=0
∂γ m

; m = A, B

(D.9) – (D.10)
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APPENDIX E: IRS DISTRICTS AND REGIONS BY STATES
STATE

DISTRICT

REGION

STATE

DISTRICT

REGION

Alabama

Gulf Coast

Southeast

Montana

Rocky Mountain

Western

Alaska

Pacific North West

Western

Nebraska

Midwest

Midstates

Arizona

Southwest

Western

Nevada

Southwest

Western

Arkansas

Arkansas-Oklahoma

Midstates

New Hampshire

New England

Northeast

New Jersey

New Jersey

Northeast

New Mexico

Southwest

Western

Central California
California

Los Angeles

Western

Northern California

Brooklyn

Southern California
Colorado

New York
Western

Manhattan

Northeast

Connecticut

Rocky Mountain
ConnecticutRhode Island

Northeast

North Carolina

North-South Carolina

Southeast

Delaware

Delaware-Maryland

Southeast

North Dakota

North Central

Midstates

Florida

North Florida

Southeast

Ohio

Ohio

Northeast

Oklahoma

Arkansas-Oklahoma

Midstates

South Florida

Upstate New York

Georgia

Georgia

Southeast

Oregon

Pacific North West

Western

Hawaii

Pacific North West

Western

Pennsylvania

Northeast

Idaho

Rocky Mountain

Western

Rhode Island

Pennsylvania
ConnecticutRhode Island

Northeast

Illinois

Illinois

Midstates

South Carolina

North-South Carolina

Southeast

Indiana

Indiana

Southeast

South Dakota

North Central

Midstates

Iowa

Midwest

Midstates

Tennessee

Kentucky-Tennessee

Southeast

Kansas

Kansas-Missouri

Midstates

Texas

North Texas

Midstates

Kentucky

Kentucky-Tennessee

Southeast

Louisiana

Gulf Coast

Southeast

Utah

Rocky Mountain

Western

Maine

New England

Northeast

Vermont

New England

Northeast

Maryland

Delaware-Maryland

Southeast

Virginia

Virginia-West Virginia

Southeast

Massachusetts

New England

Northeast

Washington

Pacific North West

Western

Michigan

Michigan

Northeast

West Virginia

Virginia-West Virginia

Southeast

Minnesota

North Central

Midstates

Wisconsin

Midwest

Midstates

Southeast

Wyoming

Rocky Mountain

Western

Mississippi
Gulf Coast
Source: The Internal Revenue Service

South Texas

111

APPENDIX F: CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE VARIABLES
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

1.00
-0.23
1.00
-0.19
0.29
1.00
0.31 -0.02
0.05
1.00
-0.24
0.11
0.23
0.11
1.00
0.17
0.05
0.52
0.35
0.13
1.00
-0.22
0.19
0.34 -0.54
0.29
0.15
1.00
-0.26
0.08
0.18 -0.54
0.08
0.07
0.74
1.00
-0.04
0.05 -0.24 -0.43 -0.60 -0.29
0.15
0.34
1.00
0.00 -0.29 -0.25 -0.13 -0.23 -0.20 -0.18
0.02
0.24
1.00
0.34 -0.03 -0.15
0.54 -0.21
0.12 -0.59 -0.53 -0.16
0.18
1.00
0.00 -0.38 -0.09
0.03 -0.21 -0.23 -0.20 -0.06
0.09
0.42
0.32
1.00
0.16
0.12
0.03
0.19
0.16
0.05 -0.12 -0.41 -0.37 -0.15
0.16 -0.17 1.00
0.16 -0.10 -0.36
0.08 -0.08 -0.43 -0.29 -0.38 -0.01 -0.01
0.26
0.26 0.51
1.00
-0.01
0.13
0.16 -0.28
0.06
0.15
0.40
0.27 -0.13 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 0.09 -0.03 1.00
Legends: A= Per return Evasion, B = Audit Rate, C= State & Federal Combined Marginal Tax Rate,
D = Real Adjusted Gross Income, E = Percent of Returns with Wages and Salaries,
F = Percent of Returns with Itemized Deductions, G = Number of Exemptions per Return, H = Percent of Joint Returns,
I = Percent of Proprietors in Total Employment, J = Percent of Retail Trade in Total Employment,
K = Percent of Service Sector in Total Employment, L = Percent of Elderly Population,
M = Percent of Non-white Population, N = Gini Coefficient, and O = Unemployment Rate.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
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APPENDIX G: SPATIAL DIAGNOSTIC TESTS

There are two approaches to test for spatial error dependence based on the results
of the within estimation. The null is expressed as H0: λ = 0 in both the approaches. One
approach is based on the extension of Moran’s I test for spatial autocorrelation, the other
on the Lagrange multiplier principle. However, as Kelejian and Prucha (2001) showed
that Moran I statistic defined is not robust to misspecification. To give credence to our
claim and to check the robustness of the Moran I, we also computed the LM statistic
following Anselin (1988).

Moran’s I Statistic

Moran’s (1950) I statistic is a well known test for spatial autocorrelation. It is a
weighted correlation coefficient used to detect departures from spatial randomness. It is
produced by standardizing the spatial autocovariance by the variance of the error and
depends on a spatial structural specification such as a spatial weights matrix or a distance
related decline function. The Moran’s I statistic is defined as

N

N
I=

N

∑∑ wij ei e j
i =1 j =1
N

S0

∑
i =1

ei2

⇐⇒ Or in matrix form I =

Ne' We
S 0 e' e

(G.1)
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where N equals the number of spatial units, wij is a weight denoting the strength of the
connection between spatial units i and j, ei is the regression residual and So is the sum of
the weights defined as

N

N

S0 = ∑∑ wij , i ≠ j

(G.2)

i =1 j =1

The expectation of I under the null hypothesis is:

E (I ) = −

[

N × tr (e' e )−1 e' We
2 S 0 (N − K )

]

(G.3)

The variance of I is determined normality assumption. The assumption of
normality is useful when we have good reason to believe the errors follow a normal
distribution. The variance of Moran I is defined as:
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[

]

[

] ([

2⎞
⎧
⎛
N 2 ⎨4 S0 + 2tr⎜ (e' e )−1 e' We ⎟ − tr (e' e )−1 e' (W + W ' )2 e − 2 tr (e' e )−1 e' We
⎝
⎠
⎩
Var (I ) =
(2S0 )2 (N − K )(N − K + 2)

]) /(N − K )⎫⎬⎭
2

(G.4)

The Lagrange Multiplier Statistic

The approach towards testing for spatial error dependence that is based on the language
Multiplier principle is outlined in Anselin (1988). In formal terms, the statistic is very
similar to the Moran’s I except for the use of a different scaling constant. Its properties
are asymptotic. The statistic is:

LM err =

( e′We / S02 ) 2
tr(WW + W ′W )

(G.5)

where the notations are as above. It is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 variate with one
degree of freedom. A high value of the statistic (and a low value of the probability)
implies rejection of the null hypothesis of no spatial association.
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